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Summary  findings
In  1990,  Argentina  privatized  its state-owned  Regulationi  plays an  important  role  in the private
telephone  company,  ENTel.  Shifting  provision  of teleconrn1Lc.1titons.  lanv arguL thalt
telecommunications  to the  private  sector  was onte of  comilpetitiotn shokld  be limiited to allow  economics  ot
the  first  actions  taken  tinder  the  reform  pro«,ram  of the  scale.  Biut limited competition  can  leid  to  abuIses of
new  president,  Carlos  Saul Menem.  monopoly  power  anid to deniarids  tr)m  customiers  alld
In privatizing  ENTel,  the government  fociuse(d  on  suppliers  for a regulatory  regimiie  to  protect  them  trom
privatization  as a way  of establishing  its reform  such  abtuses. In additior,  the  sector  requires  high stunk
credentials.  Establishiing  a post-privatization  regulatory  costs  and asset  specificity  and  the  assets'  owners  are
regitne was given lower priority. A well-defined  particularly exposed to the risks of expropriation  -
regulatory  regime was not in place before the sale, but  either outright (throughi nationalization) or grad(iial
privatization took place nonetheless.  (through service requirements or lovw  tariffs). A sta.ble,
Hill and Abdala find that despite the delay in  credible regulatory environmiTent  redcces the risk of
implem.!nting a regulatory regime, ENTel's  investment in this sector and reduces the expected rate
privatization appears to have had a net positive impact,  of returin that private investors would require to
both  on Argentina's  reputation  and on  welfare.  Th:  participate.  Establishing  a stable,  credible  regulatory
reform program had its own "virtuous cycle," creating  regime before privatization increases the value of a
and reinforcing credibility in the short run. But the  privatized telecommunications firm to potential
neglect of the regulatory regime appears to have been  purchasers by reducing the risk associated with the
costly in terms of the sale price that the government  purchase. This in turn affects the price generated by
received and the tariff levels that investors demanded.  the selling governn ent. By failing to establish such a
In the long run, this neglect, if it persists, may have a  regime ir advance  the Argentine government received
negative impact on the telecommunicationis sector's  a lower sale price  ind increased the probability that
performance.  buyers  would  capture  windfall  profits.
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Argentina  is a very recent, and given its history, unexpected entrant to the small group of
countries with privately owned telecommunications sectors.  Argentina entered this club  in November
of  1990 when the government of President Carlos Saul Menem sold the Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (ENTel) to private investors.  Although little time has passed since this sale and it
is too early to make definitive judgements  on its impact, the privatization of ENI'el does present some
interesting issues.
One of the most interesting aspects of the sale of ENTel was the sequencing of the
privatization and the development of a regulatory regime.  Argentine politics had presented the Menem
government  with a window of opportunitv in which to introduce an economic reform program.
Privatization was one of the central components of this reform program and ENTel was the first
company presented for sale.  As a result, the privatization of ENTel became a test of the Menem
government's  ability and resolve to reform the Argentine economy.  The rapid completion of the sale
became a priority.  However, the development of a regulatory regime was initially neglected.
Shifting telecommunications  into the private sector was a priority  for the Argentine
government.  However, regulation also pl.ays  an important role in the private provision of
telecommunications.  Portions of the sector are characterized by economies of scale which many
would argue implies that entry should be limited in the interests of efficiency.  However, limited
competition can lead to abuses of monopoly power and to demands from customers and suppliers for a
regulatory regime to protect them from these abuses.  Standards and interconnection rules affect the
efficiency  of the sector.  The 3ector is also characterized by high sunk costs and asset specificity.
Thus the owners of these assets are particularly exposed to the risks of expropriation.  This problem is
compounded  by the temptation presented to government to regulate the telecommunications sector in
an opportunistic manner, providing benefits for its other constituents by expropriating the sector's
assets. This expropriation can be outright, as in the case of a nationalization, or gradual, through
service requirements and/or low tariffs.'
In general, investment is a function of both the expected rate of return and the risk attached.
A credible and stable regulatory envircnment reduces the risk attached to investment in the
telecommunications sector and reduces the expected rate of return that private investors would require
in order to participate. 2 The ability of  ,overnment to provide a credible and stable regulatory
environment depends largely on a country's  institutional arrangements, particularly those that provide
safeguards against opportunistic interventions by government.  The design of new regulatory
institutions or the reform of old ones can create new safeguards, but pre-existing institutions will
constrain the options available.
'  The analysis in the paper is based on the framework developed by Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller
in the res  Arch  proposal for this project, "Regulation, Institutions, and Economic Efficiency: Promoting
Regulatory Reform and Private Sector Participation in Developing Countries," February 26,  1991.
2  This is true whether the entry and tariff  provisions of a regulatory regime provides for high
returns or low returns.  The more stable and credible the regime, the lower the risks associated with
investment and the more attractive the investment.THE ARGENTINE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 2
Privatization adds another dimension to the-  ro!e of regulation in reducing the risk of investing
in the telecommunications sector.  The establishment  of a stable and credible regulators  regime before
.rivatization takes place increases the value of a privatized telecommunications firm to potential
purchasers by reducing the risk associated with the purchase.  Thlis in turin will affect the price
received by the selling government.  Failure to establish such  a reginie will decrease the sale price and
increase the probability that the buyers will capture windfall profits  if a stable regulatory regime is
introduced after the sale.  In addition, the privatization prcess  itself can create new safeguards.
Wide-spread domestic shareholding of the privatized company can create a new constituency that
should resist attempts by government to expropriate their assets for the benefit of other constituencies.
Transparenicy and predictability  in the privatization process are important signals of the government's
later intentions.
In privatizing ENTel the Argentine government was focussed on the role of the privatization in
establish.ng the government's  reform credentials.  The establishment of a post-privatization regulatory
regime was given lower priority and as a result a well-definec  regulatory regime was not in place
before the sale.  Nonetheless, the privatization took place and so fir  appears to have had a net positive
impact, both on Argentina's  reputation and on welfare.  In this instance, it seems that the reform
program had its own  "virtuous cycle", creating and reinforcing credibility in the short-run.  However,
the neglect of the regulatery  regime appears to have been costly in tenns of the sale price obtained by
the government and the tariff  levels demanded by investors.  In the long-run this neglect also may
have a negative impact on the performance of the sector.
This paper attempts to answer the following questions.  First, why and how did the economic
reform program and the privatization of ENTel come about?  Second, in the privatization process, in
the definition of its regulatory framework, and in the subsequent implementation of the regulatory
regime has Argentina  succeeded in avoiding regulatory failure?  That is to say, has the Argentine
government demonstrated that it is committed to an environment that will support private investment
and are the newly privatized companies responding by  investing and improving services in the sector'?
Third, what lessons does the Argentine experience with privatization and regulation have to offer and
what additional  actions might the government  of Argentina consider taking at this time?  Finally, what
impact has the privatization and subsequent regulatory regime had on welfare in Argentina?
The issues are addressed in the following order.  The next section examines the dynamics of
Argentine politics and attempts to explain why historically government policies have undermined
Argentina's  economic development and why this changed during the transition  from the administration
of President Raul Alfonsin to that of President Carlos Saul Menem in 1989.  This section also reviews
Argentina's  institutional heritage in order to highlight the weaknesses of these institutions and the
problems these posed for ensuring the credibility of the Menem administration's  reform program.  The
third  section gives a short history and overview of the Argentine telecommunications sector leading up
to the start of the  1990 privatization.  Section four discusses the actual process of the ENTel
privatization and to what extent that process enhanced the government's  credibility as a regulator.
Section five examines the role played by regulation as a commitiment mechanism during and after the
privatization of ENTel.  This section also outlines the legal framework for regulation of the
telecommunic,  o.1s sc'tor  in Argentina.  The preliminary firm and market evidence regarding the
credibility and sustairx.bility of the regulatory regime is reviewed in section six.  Section seven
highlights  some changes the Argentine may wish to make to its telecommunications regulatory regime
and suggests s,.ne  lessons for other countries. Finally. in the conclusion the welfare  impact of theTIHE ARGENTINE  rELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 3
privatizaLion is evaluated and foulid to be generally positive, arid the link to the regulatory regime is
discussed.
11.  Argentina's  Politi al and Institutiornal  Heritage
Political volatility  in Argentina has taken its toll on the countiy's  economy. Decades of
destructive competition betwveen  political factions has undermined Argentina's  economic and political
development.  By .ie  late  1980's, Paul H. Lewis observed in The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, that
"...A.,entina  fascinates students of development because, in so many respects, it seems to be going
backward.  Althougih it possesses many modem  institutions, they are decaying rapidly." 3 The
economic policies introduced  by the Menem government have been a departure from the policies of
previous Argentine administrations. These liberal, market-oriented policies have resulted in two years
of growth for the Argentine economy and a substantial reduction in intlation. 4 To understand how this
change in policy came about and whether it will continue it is necessary to examine the underlying
political and economic forces. 5
a. The Dynamics of Argentine Politics
Argentina's  history since World War I has been characterized by a reversal of economic
development  paralleled by a reversal of political development.  While Argentina appeared to be
developing a broad-based partit.ipatory democracy in the first three decades of this century, since the
1930s control of government has fluctuated between authoritarian or exciusionary regimes and
populist-corporatist ones.  (See Table  1.)  Since 1930 there have been five military coups and
numerous military  interventions in government, resulting in military rule for nineteen of the past sixty
years.  "Restt,ctive democracy" in which the constitutional niceties were "observed", but major parties
were banned, was imposed for an additional nineteen years in this period.  Changes of regime have
been accompanied by radical changes in policy designed to serve the constituents of the new regime.
These changes have been made at the expense of the groups then out of government and, ultimately, at
the expense of the country of as a whole.  Successive governments have followed a type of "beggar-
thy-neighbor" strategy, where the neighbor has been the constituents of the party out of government.
Instead of cooperating to increase the level of income in Argentina, rival parties have competed in a
zero-sum  or negative-sum game.
This political discontinuity has been accompanied by a downwarr 4 ipiral of economic
performance.  Before  World War I, Argentina's  per capita income was similar to that of Germany, and
Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North
Carolina  Press,  1990), p. I.
4  Real GDP growth was 8.5%  in 1991 and 9.0%  in 1992.  Inflation has been dramatically reduced
and the net investnmenit  level has increased. Tax revenues have gone up and tax evasion has gone
down.  Deregulation and increased competition have occurred.  Trade liberalization has taken place.
5 The subsection draws heavily on a report prepared by Mathew D. McCubbins of the University
of California, San Diego, "Prospects for Stability in Argentine  Politics", mimeo, March  15, 1993.THE ARGENTINE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 4
was higher than that of Sweden,  France,  Austria, Italy, and Japan. Before Worid War 11 :\rgentina's
per capita inmome  was still higher  than that of Austria, Italy, and Japan.  However,  by 1  9t;5
Argentina's per capita income  was only one-quarter  of that of Japan and by 1982 its per capita income
had fallen to a level comparable  to that of Chile, Mexico,  and Brazil. 6
Argentina's political instability  results from the interaction  between  three underlying
conditions. First, indus.rial  development  has be(  !.'mited. The Argentine  economy was and, to a
large extent, still is centered on export-oriented  ag.iculture. This has been the only sector that could
generate an economic  surplus  that could be used to support industrial  development. However,
government policies have penalized  the agricultural  sector  to the benefit of other sectors of thw
economy, ioading  to a decline in the surplus  generated  by the sector and reducing  the country's growth
potential. Declining  growth has exacerbated  the tensions betweei, on the one hand, the urban working
classes and, on the other hand, the agrarian elite and the urban middle class. The conflict over
stagnant or shrinking real income has carried over into the political  arena.
Second,  the economy  of Argentina  is split regionally. With a few ex.ceptions,  what industry
there is is concentrated  around Buenos  Aires while agriculture  is the dominant economic  activi:y in the
rest of the country. This econcrnic  split has produced  a political split; the interests  of the
industrialized  region, which is highly d; )endent on import substitution,  are at odds with those of the
agrarian regions.
Third, and perhaps most importantly,  Argentine  national political institutions  and the rules that
govern elections  combine to add another source of instability. Argentina is a federal republic with a
constitution  which provides  for the co-existence  of federal and provincial  levels of government. The
national  government  is comprised  of three branches:  executive,  LIgislative,  and judicial.  Executive
power is vested in the president  of the republic, who is elected by an electoral  college to a six-year
non-renewable  term and who serves as both the chief of state and head of government. The Congress
is comprised  of an upper and a lower house. The members  of the Chamber of Deputies  (the lower
house) are elected by uriversal adult suffrage from a closed party list.  The members  of the Senate are
elected by the provincial  legislatures  by plurality, with two from each province. The two senators  from
the capital region are elected  through the same electoral college  mechanism  as the president.
Two features  of the Congressional  electoral rules undermine  the potential  for cc`hesive,
national  party coalitions  and increase  the probability  that the electorate  will produce  divided partisan
governments. First, deputies  are elected provincially,  not nationally,  and the list of candidates  are
controlled  by provincial  party organizations. As a result, same-party  deputies from a single province
tend to have similar pol.tical view points, but there can be considerable  variation  between  the view
points of the provincial  organizations  and the nationil organization  of the same  political party.
Second,  the timing of elections  reinforces  the provincialization  of the political system. The term of
office for deputies is four years and for senators it is nine years. As a result, only half the deputies
and one third of the senators are elected  at the same time as the president. This provides a very
6 Carlos Waisman,  Reversal  of Development  in Arzentina:  Postwar  Counterrevolutionary  Policies
and Their Structural Consequences  (Princeton,  N. J.: Princeton University  Press, 1987)  and Alan
Taylor, "External  Dependence,  Demographic  Burdens,  and Argentine  Economic  Declile After the
Belle Epoque,"  The Journal of Economic  History,  Vol. 52, No.4 (Dec. 1992),  907-935.THE ARGENTINE  T'ELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTFOR  Page 5
limited incentive to nationalize and unify the federdl and provincial party organizations.  In addition,
the staggering of elections means that the composition of any coalition will be  constantly changing.  A
national election irvolving  half the seats in the lower house occurs every other year, whlile  every third
year one third of the seats in the Senate are at stake.
As a result, in addition to a diversity of parties, there are significant divisions within parties.
Today in Argentina,  the two largest parties are the Radicals and the Peronists.  While the Radicals
generally represent the middle class, there are both moderate and extreme factions wNthin  the party and
in various periods there have been more than one Radical party.  Th  same is true for the Peronists,
whose base is the urban, unionized working class.  The Peronists have been represented by more than
one party and the party has been segmented into moderate and extreme factions.  In the recent
Argentine  clections the effective number of parties has been over three.'  However, none of these
parties cut across regional and class divisions.
The destructive pattern of politics described above began to change after the restoration of
democracy and the elections in 1983.  The election resulted in a  Jivided govemment;  the Radical party
controlled the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies, but the Peroni"t party controlled the Senate.
This resulted  in a stalemate, where the discretion of the president was seve.rely limited by the Peronists
in the Senate.  As result, the Radicals were unable to pursue their own interests at the expense of the
Peronists. This deadlock ended ihe "beggar-thy-neighbor" behavior, but it did not result in any
cooperative behavior that might have allowed Argentina to improve its economic performance.  The
economic situation continued to decline, threatening the viability of democratic government.  Army
rebellions confronted President Alfonsin in April of 1987 and December of 1988.
This stalemate ended with the elections of  1989 in which the Peronists won control of the
Presidency and both houses of Congress.  However, rather than returning to the historical pattern of
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, the Peronists embarked on a program of economic reform.  This
change seems to have been made possible by a conjunction of events.  T  he Argentine constitution
provides for a long transition period between the elections in May and the swearing in of a new
government  in December, Laving the departing presid.it  as a "lame-duck".  During this period in
1989 the economy deteriorated rapidly.  Hlyperinflation  manifested itself for the first time in Argentine
history, raising fears over the viability of the economic and political system. 8
Faced with the possibility of a return to military rule, the Radical party concluded an
agreement with the incoming Peronists.  President Menem took office in July. five mnonths  ahead of
'  Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design
and Electoral Dynamics,  (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitv Press,  1992), 220.  The effective number
of parties is a number constructed to represent the number of parties that have a chance at competing
for election.  This is similar to constructing the effective number of new entrants  in a market.  There
may be many potential entrants, while none are actually observed (or there may be many observed, but
none are competitive).
8 While Argentina  had frequently suffered from high inflation the acceleration il  the rate of
increase in consumer prices from 343 % in 1988 to 3079 % in 1989 was unprecedented. (Source: IMF
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schedule, and  in return the Radicals in the Congress uindertook  to support his economic initiatives.
This effectively created a coalition between the moderate factions of the Peror,ist and Radical parties
and permitted the introduction of new economic policies designed to improve the performanice  of lie
Argentine economy.  TIhese  policies potentially will be  2fit all Argenitines. For the tine  being, politics
in Argentina  appear to have switched from a negative-sum game to a positive-sum game.
The challenge for  President Menem as he e,.tered office was to restore  internatik lal and
domestic confidence in Argentina.  His administration acted quickly to inst .ute an emergelicy austerity
program and a privatization program.  On August 17, 1989, the Argentine Congress passed the
administration's  "Reforma.  del Estado" (State Refomi)  law.  This la"  laid out the procedures for
privatization. It also granted the administration sweeping powers, iihcluding  the power to change by
presidential decree pre-existing  legislotion that was inconsistent with the privatization  program.  ENTel
was the first enterprise on the list of the candidates for privatization annexed to the legislatior,. 9
The privatization of ENTel was one the first actions of a comprehensive reform  pro1gram
which included fiscal reform and tax enforcement; monetary refonn;  and deregulation.  The program
sought to fundamentally alter the roles of government, labor, and the private sector.  The Menem
government set out to change the reputation of the government and, by extension, the country.  The
success of the program was depenoent on the government's  improving its reputation as an economic
actor.  Speed in implementation was essential for the viabi!ity of the entire reform program.
In this manner the reform program created its own dynamic which served to offset Argentina's
existing institutiona! weaknesses.  This is discussed in more detail in the following  subsection.
b. Argentina's  Institutional  Heritage  and Implications  for the Credibility  of Reform
For economic reform to succeed in attracting private investment, it must be credible to
investors over the medium- to long-term.  Othetwise private investors will be concerned about the
potential for expropriation of their assets, either directly through nationalization or indirectly through
regulation, price controls, high taxes and the like.  If investors perceive that the risks of expropriation
are high, they will demand high risk premia or, if these prernia are not available, will not invest at all.
The effect will be to lower the amount of new private investment and reduce the likelihood that the
reform program will succeed.  The Menem administration inherited Argentina's  poor record and
reputation for economic policy.  When embarking on the privatizatio.i of ENTel the Argentine
government was faced with the challenge of changing the country's  reputation and boosting  its
credibility,  both in general and  in the context of the privatization and subsequent reai lation of the
telecommunications  sector.  Unfortunately. Argentina's  institutional heritage did not ofer  many tools
for this  undertaking.
The comparative study of which this case is a part highlights the roles of three exogenous
features  in determining a country's  capacity to develop a regulatory system ihat canl provide a credible
commitment that governments will refrain from arbitrary  behavior: informnal  norms of behavior; a
strong and independent judiciary;  and the structure of legislative and executive institutions.
Argentina's  historical political culture  lent little credence to informal norms; unlike, for example,  in
9 Law 23,696/1989.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 7
the United Kingdom, informa'  rnorms  have not restrained political actors from acting punitively
towards their antagonists. Similariy,  the Argentinc  judiciary offered little in the way of credibility;
confidence  in the judicial system was low. In theory the judiciary was nominally  independenit;  the
Argentine  constitution  provided for judges to be appointed for life terms by the President  with the
approval  of the Senate. However,  in practice,  changes  in governimenit  typically have been
accompanied  by turnover -among  the judiciary. While the Menem  government  itself did not unidertake
a wholesale  of replacement  of the judiciary, in 199r it packed  the Sup-ame  court (with the agreement
of Congress)  by increasing  the number  of justice, from 7 to 15.10
The structure  of Argentina's legislative  and executive institutions  did offer some opportunity
for commitment. Given the division  or powers between  the two branches  of goveil.ment  and the
probability  that subsequent  elections  were likely to lead to the executive  and legislature  being
controlled  by different parties,  any law enacted  by the unified government  under President  Menem
would be difficult  to reverse. However,  in the interest  of speed in the privatization  of ENTel anc.  the
implementation  of the first stage of the reform program,  the Meneisi  administration  chose not to use
this mechani5m." It relied instead  on the powers  to act by executive  decree given to it by the State
Reform Law.
In Argentina, two additional mechanisms have enhanced the government's  -redibility.
However, both of these mechanisms  are transitory  and are unrelated  to institution  building. First, the
ENTel privatization  was one of the first and most visible components  of the Menem  government's
reform program. In order to ensure that it ean continue its reform program,  the government  has an
incentive  not to act opportunistically  towards the newly-privatized  telecommunications  providers, lest
the credibility  of the entire program  be undermined; Second, the reform program  has led to an
improvement  in Argentina's  econormic  performance,  increasing  the incentives  for political actors  to
continue to support reform. However,  should  Argentina's economic  performance  falter, this
cooperation  may be lost and politics may revert to operating  on a "beggar-thy-neighbor"  basis.' 2
After a brief review  of the history of the Argentine  telecommunications  sector,  the paper will
return to an examination  of the privatization  process followed  by a discussion  of the roles of
privatization  and regulation  in developing  a credible  environment  for private investment  in the
telecommuiications  sector and to what degree this has been successful.
0  While confidence in the judiciar.  is low, the Menem administration is now taking steps to
reform the judiciary.  Once this process is complete, it will give the government add;fional means by
which to commit itself.
"  Later privatizations, which took place after the cxpiry of the State Reform Law, were
implemented by legislation.  This was true of the privatizations of natural gas, power, oil, and the
ports.  While in some cases reliance on legislation  caused  delays in the privatization  process,  these
delays did not have the same potential  negative  impact  on the credibility  of the reform program  as a
delay in onc of the first privatizatiouis  might have had.
12  One such instance would be if the deterioration in Argentina's  terms of trade that has taken
place since the introduction of the reform program were to be accompanied by a reversal of capital
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III. The Argentine  Telecommunications Sector before Privatization
A large and relatively atltiuent  couLntry,  Argentina has  had botlh  strong  demand  for
telecommiiications services  and  the resouirces  to invest in the provision of these  services. As a result
the country has  a large  telecommuinications  intfrastrujcttire.  Relative  to other countries  and  given its
income  level, Argentina had  a higher  than average  nuimber  ot' lines per capita.  (See Figure  3.)  Initialk
telephone  services  were provided by private companies  with minimal regyulation  by the federal
government. However,  after the election of President  Peron  in  1946  the telephone  companies  were
gradually nationalized. By 1990,  90% of telephone  lines were owned  by EN'T'el. While the level of
telephone  penetration  has been  high, over time problems  with the backlog  of uninet  demiand,  the
quality of service,  and level of corruption within ENTel has  increased. In 1988,  the administration  of
President  Raul Alfonsin atteinpted  to reform the sector  by partially privatizing ENTel.  This initiative
failed because  President  Alfonsin's party did not control both houises  of the Congress. However,  onk'
a year later, President  Menem was  able to initiate the ultimately successful  privatization of ENI'el with
the cooperation  of the Congress.
a. The Farly Years
Argentina's first telephone  company  was  formed in 1880,  four years  after the invention of the
telephone  by Alexander  Graham  Bell.  'This  company,  Societe  du Pantelephone  de Loch, started
operations  in the city of Buenos  Aires in 1881  with 20 lines.  Shortly tilereafter,  two more companies
began  operations. In 1886,  these  thiree  companies  merged,  forming the ULnion  Telefonica  del Rio de la
Plata (UTRP).  Backed  by B3r::ish  capital, UT'RP  expanded  to serve  the more aftluent provinces  around
Buenos  Aires.  Meanwhile,  other small firms entered  the market  elsewhere  in Argentina,  operating
under licenises  granited  by a province cr city.  T'here  was  n0o  federal  regulationi  of the sector  until 1904,
when the government  of Argenitinia  issued  a decree  requiring all private operators  to report their
activities to the Execultive.  In  1907  the federal  government  set  ihe tariffs for telephonie  services  in
Argentina.  '
In 1929,  the Americani  company,  International  'I'elepholne  & Teleg-aph  (ITT), entered  the
Argentine market by buying UTRP. At approximately  the same  timie,  the Swedish  group, Ericssoni,
took up equity in the Coompanlia  Argentinia  de 'I'elefonos  (CAT).  Ericsson  had  originialiv been  an
equipment  supplier  to CAT and  the company  hiad  run up large  unpaid  bills; tilis debt w  as exchianged
for equity in tile company.  CA'I' operated  in the provinces  of Mendoza,  San  Juani,  Santiago  del Estero,
Salta,  Tucarnan,  and Entre Rios. By 1935,  there Nkere  43 different telephonie  companies  operating  ir,
Argentina.
In this period, domestic  integration  ot' the telephone  services  in Argelitilia was  very poor.  A
subscriber  in thie  northierinimlost  province  of Argentlina,  Juju>.  could place  a call to Europe  without
muchi  difficulty.  but it was v irtually impossible  to place  a call to Buenos  Aires.  In 1935,  tihe  federal
government  instructed  the individual telephone  companiies  to make  arrangemiienits  for inter-provincial
connections. In 1936,  an  execuitive  decree  "sas issued,  declarinig  that telephonie  services  were national
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services under the federal jurisdiction.  Henceforth, all private telephone cornpanies would operate
with a "precarious permit" status.  The federal government would not grant formal concessions to
operate and operating permits could be canceled at any time.  The decree also gave the Argentine
government the right to acquire the assets of operating companies.'
b. Nationalization  and State Control
By the end of the Second World War, Argentina had accumulated foreign capital reserves of
nearly US$  1.7 billion as a result of its exports of raw materials to the combatants.  The Argentine
government of President Juan Domingo Peron used these reserves to buy some of the large domestic
firms that were controlled by foreign owners.  T hese purchases included railways, ports, power
companies, and the telephone companies.  ITT's holding in the UTRP was purchased in 1946 for US$
95 million.5 By 1948, the new firm was wholly owned by the Argentine government and  it became
the Direccion Nacional de Telefonos del Estado (DNTE).  A year later companies in four northeastern
provinces were acquired.  This process of geographical expansion continued until 1969, encompassing
17 of Argentina's  23 provinces and 31 private companies.  In 1956, DNTE was renamed ENTel.6
The exception to ENTel's  expansion was CAT.  Although Ericsson was prepared to sell its
investment in CAT, it wanted a price comparable to that paid to ITT.  A sale to the Peron government
was virtually completed, but was interrupted by the 1955 military revolt.  From  1948 to  1959 an
executive decree prohibited CAT from making additional investments in its system while its sale was
being negotiated.  Finally,  in 1959, the government of President Arturo Frondizi decided that it would
not buy CAT and the company was allowed to raise its tariffs and expand its network.  CAT
continued to operate under provincial, and therefore precarious licenses, until  1992.  It operated under
the same tariff structure as ENTel; these tariffs were negotiated between the government and ENTel,
and CAT was required to apply them  in its territory.
Throughout this period, overall telecommunications policy was the responsibility of the
Secretary of Communications.  As defined in the  1936 executive decree, telecommunications were
"national" services.  This meant that the federal government had the right to both undertake and to
control the provision of services, set prices, define investment services, and to grant precarious permits
to private firms.  The 1936 decree was succeeded by the National Telecommunications Law of  1972
which was enacted by the military government of President Alejandro Agustin Lanusse.  The law
reflected the growing nationalism and protectionism that emerged even before the return of Peron in
1973.  The content of the law was not significantly different from that of the  1936 decree, but it was
more comprehensive, including telex, radio, and television, and its language was more explicit than
that of its predecessor.  Under the law, the state held a legal monopoly of all telecommunications
activities.  As it deemed convenient, the federal government could provide these services itself or grant
D  Decree  91,698/1936.
'5  In 1946  terms.
16 Lewis, pp.  177-195; Crawley, pp.  110-1  15; and James Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation,
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permits with precarious status to other providers.  'The  government was responsible for policing the
sector, for encouraging research, for promoting the development of domestic industry, and for
coo-dinating all activities in the sector.'"
Despite the discontinuities in Argentinie politics, there was a consistent theme in
telecommunications  policy.  This was the development of an Argentine telecommunications equipment
industry.  As it did in many other sectors, the Argentine government promoted import substitution in
telecommunications equipment, forcing ENT'el to source its needs in Argentina.  The result was that
ENTel was limited in its access to technology and burdened with the cost of buying equipment at
prices well above those in other countries.  T'he outcome was equipment prices higher than  in Europe
or in the U.S and higher than in some other Latin American countries.
Despite the high costs imposed by Argentine industrial policy, by the late  1950s ENTel was
one of the largest telecommunications carriers in the world.  This may be both a reflection of
Argentina's  relative wealth and of the suppliers'  demand for government patronagu. In  1956 it was
one of the ter, largest finns  in termns  of the number of lines installed and it ranked seventh in the
number of calls placed. In 1957 Argerntina  had 42.86 % of the telephones installed in South America
and the telephone  density in the city of Buenos Aires was almost twice as high as any other major
urban area in Latin America.  However, even as the system grew, the backlog of lines increased.  In
many areas where ENTel failed to provide service, local cooperatives sprang up to build and
administer  local networks.'8 In addition, ENTel developed managerial and labor problems: the quality
of service provided was poor; the unions in some cases took over managerial activities; strikes were
accompanied by sabotage; phantom workers collected salaries from the company; and clandestine
telephone connections were made where payments were not made to ENTel but rather to ENTel staff.
(See Figures  I to 8 and Tables I to 4 at the end of the paper for more details.)
c. The 1988 Attempt by the Alfonsin Government to Privatize ENTel's Management
The civilian  government of President Raul Alfonsin first tried to improve the level of service
and reduce the backlog of unmet demand by using dramatically higher connection chiarges to finance
an increase in ENTel's  level of investment.  When that failed the Alfonsin government tried to
partially privatize the firm in a bid to improve management and attract more capital.  By 1985 the
backlog represented  1,298,000 lines or 52.7% of the lines in service.  (See Figure 5 and Table 2.)
The Megatel expansion plan that was launched in 1985 was intended to both address this backlog and
promrte  domestic industry.'"
The Megatel Plan was to provide for the installation of I million  lines between 1986 and
1989.  Neither the Argentine government nor ENTel were able to finance this expansion, so the plan
1'  Law 19,798/1972.
1  ENTel Annual Reports.  1958-60. Local cooperatives did not appear in the areas served by CAT,
apparently because CAT was able to meet demand.
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relied on telephone users to directly finance the expansion in services.  Connection charges for
residential users increased 486% and for businesses 629%.  UJsers  had to make this payment in
advance  to join the waiting  list for a new telephone line.  Only 650,000 customers subscribed to the
plan. 20 Even so, the installation of lines under the plan was still not completed in 1990 and these
liabilities were carried over into the privatized companies.
The appointment of a new Minister of Public Works (the ministry which included the
Secretariat  of Communications) in October  1987 marked a turning point in the government's  attitude
towards ENTel.  Faced with a large government deficit, with a rf'ed for additional  investment in the
telecommunications  sector that neither ENTel or the government could finance (even with the Megatel
program),  and with a high level of corrupt and irregular practices within ENTel, the new minister
advocated the liberalization of the supply of telecommunications services and the introduction of new
private management and the partial privatization of ENTel.  The liberalization of the sector was
initiated by three deregulation and demonopolization executive decrees that allowed the Secretary of
Telecommunications to issue permits to private telecommunications service providers.  These decrees
were issued by President Alfonsin even though they were inconsistent with the  1972 National
Telecommunications Law. 2'
Given the high level of political uncertainty and ENTel's administrative problems and internal
corruption,  the Alfonsin government decided to sell the company through negotiations, inviting a
potential investor to evaluate the company and then discuss terms.  The government planned to keep
control of the company by retaining 51% of the shares, while 9% of the shares were to be transferred
to workers for feee, and 40% would be sold to a new investor who would be responsible for
management of the company.
The govemment  entered into a preliminary agreement with Telefonica of Spain.  Under the
terms of the agreement the partially privatized company would have a complete monopoly over the
provision of all types telecommunications services in Argentina, including cable TV but not cellular
telephone and public telegraph, for 25 years with an option to extend this monopoly another  10 years.
This monopoly would extend over the regions served by CAT, which would lose its licenses.  There
was a provision for direct state assistance in providing service in areas with dispersed populations.
The proposal left the company enormrous  discretion in other areas including accounting standards, the
setting of tariffs,  the determination of rules for interconnection, and the definition of which value-
added services did and did not come under its exc;usive license.
20  ENTel attributed this to an absolute lack of demand for lines.  However, this is not very
credible given the size of the pre-existing backlog.  This shortfall in new subscriptions catnnot be
attributed entirely to the higher price eithe-.  Calculations of prices elasticities of demand for lines
indicate that demand  should have been higher.  The most likely explanation is that customers were
skeptical as to whether they would receive the lines they subscribed for and that they feared that their
funds would be drawn out of ENTel to finance the growing government deficit.  See Abdala,  1991,
pp. 51-52.
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However, the Alfonsin administration was unable to persuade the Congress to approve its
decision to partially privatize ENTel. The Radical Party had lost the  1987 congressional elections and
the Peronists held a majority itn  the Senate.  Even though there  was popular support  for the partial
privatization  of ENTel, the Congress opposed the government's  proposal. 22 This oppositioin was due
in part to some members ideological objections to privatization and in part to some members
objections to the actual terms of the deal, particularly to the lack of competition and regulation.  More
importantly, the Peronists also anticipated winning the  1989 presidential election and for that reason
were unwilling to support any action that would help the Radical Party candidate.  Ultimately, the
government  ran out of time.  The Peronist presidential candidate, Carlos Saul Menem, was elected in
May  1989 and the Minister of Public Works, Rodolfo Terragno, was tapped to act as the liaison
between the out-going  and in-coming governments, ending his efforts to partially privatize ENTel.
Thus, for political reasons, the Telefonica proposal in the end was unsuccessful.  The proposal
was flawed in that it neither provided for competition or for adequate regulation of the
telecommunications  sector.  However, it opened the door for another, more complete reform of ENTel.
IV. The Privatization of ENTel
One of the most remarkable aspects of the  1990 privatization of ENTel is that it happened at
all.  The unheralded shift from adversarial to cooperative politics provided a window of opportunity.
The primary goal of the Menem government was to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the
shift in Argentine politics and demonstrate its ability to transform the Argentine economy by reducing
both the scope of government activity and the level of the government's  indebtedness.  By actually
completing the privatization, the Menem government was able to demonstrate early in its term that it
had the resolve and ability necessary to fundamentally change the role of government in the Argentine
economy.  The momentum for the sale was derived  from the country's  economic crisis and a rare
political opportuiaity.  This gave the sale its own dynamic; the fact that the completion of the sale was
central to the government's  attempt to establish its credibility imposed a discipline on the actors
involved and limited the influence of the sale's critics.  While thc privatization team recognized the
importance of the sale conditions and the need for a regulatory regime, these issues were secondary to
the completion of the transaction.  However, the conduct of the sale itself, as well as its completion,
contained  signals as to the future conduct of the Argentine government. 23 The chapter first gives a
22  Government polls had shown that while Argentineans did not approve of privatization in
general, they did support the privatization of ENTel.  A poll conducted by Guillermo Bravo and
Pessah consultants showed that 55-59% of the interviewed ENTel users had expressed support of the
proposal to partially privatize ENTel.
23  During the public ceremony in which the executive decree establishing the terms and conditions
of the sale of ENTel was signed the Minister of Public Works and Services, Jose Roberto Dromi
explained that "the Government, complying with the mandate from the people, wvished  to change the
structure of the state in Argentina," La Nacion, January 8. 1990, "Se pone en marcha la privatizacion
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brief overview of the privatization process and thien reviews how the process itself can signal and
solidify the government's  commitment the change in regime.
a. The Process  of Privatization
Following the passage of the State Reform Law on August 17, 1989, the Menemn  goverirnent
moved quickly  to start the privatization process.  Thle  executive decree initiating the privatization
process and laying out principles for the privatization of ENTel was issued on September  1  2,  1989.
Drawing on the powers delegated to the executive by the State Reform law, this decree modified
portions of the 1972 National Telecommunications law that were incompatible with the privatization,
striking out its provisions that had reserved for the government the exclusive rights to provide and
control telecommunications  services.  An intervenor was appointed to oversee the privatization.  She
and her team immediately began work on preparing the company for sale. 2'
Early in the privatization process the government of Argentina approached the World Bank for
technical and policy advice.  Eventually, the privatization of ENTel became one of the conditions for
the Bank's  Public Enterprise Reformn  Loan.  This conditionality intensified the government's  incentives
to complete the transaction and provided the privatization team with leverage against parties who
opposed the privatization.
In anticipation that political resistance to the sale of ENTel, both outside and inside the
government, would grow over time a very tight timetable was set for the bidding process and for the
accompanying institutional reforms.  The iieed for speed also determined that the privatization would
be implemented through executive decrees as provided for in the State Reform law, rather than
through additional legislation which would have posed the risk of being caught up by interest groups
in the Congress.  These executive decrees were both more easily implemented and reve;sed than
legislation.  However, since they were officially issued by the President's office, they carried more
weight than independent announcements from the privatization team. 25
The "Pliego de Bases y Condiciones para la Privatizacion del Servicio Publico de
Telecommunications" (Document of the Terms and Conditions for the Privatization of
Telecommunications Services, henceforth referred to as the Pliego) contained in executive decree
62/90 of January 5,  1990 laid out the conditions for the sale of ENTel.  Although subjected to
numerous modifications  in th.. course of the bidding process (which are discussed in more detail in the
A December 14, 1989 article in the Wall Street Journal titled "Will Argentina's  Menem Have
the Guts?" questioned whether the president would actually carry through with his proposed reforms.
24 Decrees 59/1990, 60/1990, 61/1990, and 62/1990.
25  Later privatizations, that took place subsequent to the privatizations provided for  in the State
Reform Law, were implemented by laws passed by Congress rather than by decrees.  This is true of
the privatizations  natural gas, power, oil, and the ports.  While in some cases this caused delaNs in the
privatization process, these delays did not have the same potential negative impact on the credibility of
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next subsection), the outline of the actual transaction largely followed that issued on January 5.
ENTel would be split into two companies that would each be granted a license to provide basic
telecommunications  services in Argentina.  The first 60% of the shares in these companies  was to be
sold by competitive  international bid.  The remaining 25% was reserved for a public flotation, 5% for
sale to cooperatives, and  10% for ENTel employees.  In addition the Pliego laid out the timetable and
the principles of the regulatory regime for the sector.  A copy of the timetable is included in Table 5
at the end of this case.  The bid was to be announced almost immediately and  it was planned that the
transfer to the new owners would take place on October 8,  1990.
The Pliego presented two Licensee Companies for sale.  These two companies, the "Northem
Company" and the "Southern Company" were created by decree and were given the exclusive licenses
to provide basic telephone services for a limited period.  At the same time a new company with an
exclusive licenF-e  to provide intemnational  services for a limited period and a new company to provide
"competitive" services also were created by decree. 26 The ownership of these two companies was split
equally between the Northemn  Company and the Southern Company. 27
The licensee companies were granted an exclusive license for the basic telephone service for a
period of seven years,  provided they met a set of minimum performance requirements for investment
and quality of service. 28 They were also granted an option to extend the exclusive license for an
additional three years if they met a higher set of performance targets.  After the end of this period, the
companies would continue to have a license to operate, but it would no longer be exclusive. 29 The
2e  The services open to competition  from other existing or potential licensees included data
transmission, naval radio transmission, and telex.
27  The assets of ENTel were to be allocated amongst these four companies according to the
services the companies were to provide.  The Northern Company had an exclusive license to provide
basic telephone services in the northern states of Argentina and in the northern half of the city of
Buenos Aires.  The Southern Company had an exclusive license to provide basic telephone services in
the southemn  states and  in the southern half of the city of Buenos Aires.  The basis telephone service
was defined as "...the provision of fixed telecommunication links that form part of the public telephone
network or that are connected to such network and the provision of the means for urban, interurban
and international live voice telephone service (Pliego of January 5, 1990, paragraph 8. 1, contained in
Decree 62/1990)."  All other services were deemed to be open to competition.
28  More exactly, this period is comprised of a two year transition period and a five year exclusive
period.
29  The government of Argentina had considered privatizing ENTel without an exclusive license.
lIowever,  this option was rejected.  The exclusive license was thc most valuable asset in the package.
Without it, the government felt that it would be unlikely that there would be any bids.  Exclusivity
was also a necessary condition for generating the income that would be necessary to finance increased
investment in the sector.  (This was also the logic behind the exclusive license for  international
services.)  However, by splitting the market for basic services into to exclusive geographical zones the
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Pliego also laid out the obligations the licensee companies would have to fulfill in order to retain their
licenses. 30 In order to prequalify to bid for either  licensee company, a consortium had to meet a
detailed set of criteria.  The purpose of these conditions was to ensure thiat  a winning consortium
would have the technical ability to run a licensee company and the finanicial  depth to make the
purchase and to meet the obligatory investment goals."
The minimum price  for the licensee companies, set in a separate decree on February 28,  1990,
had two parts: a cash component and a component to be paid by the cancellation of the Argentinie
government's  debt.  In addition, the Argentine government would assume all of ENI'el's  existing
debts; these would be replaced by debt in the forrn of notes payable to the Argentine goveniment.
The minimum  cash portion of the bid was set at US$ 114 million for the southern licensee company
and US$  100 million  for the northern company.  There was no minimum amount  set for the sovereign
Argentine  debt component of the bid price.  The level oi %vc,porate  debt for the two companies was set
at US$ 202 million for the southern company and US$ 178 million for the northern.
Of the  14 potential purchasers who bought the bidding documents for US$ 20,000 apiece,  7
submitted applications for prequalification by the April  19, 1990 deadline.  These seven consortiums
addition, by creatinig  two companies, the governiment  ensured that there would be at  least two strong
potential competitors at the end of the exclusive period.
30  These obligations  included the basic services goals the companies had to meet to keep the
exclusive license; the obligation to prepare accounts in sufficient detail to permit regulation of the
service and to ensure that there was no cross-subsidization between services, which was prohibited;
and provision for interconnection betwveen  the licensee companies and with independent operators and
the providers of competitive services.  All purchases of goods or services over US$ 500,000 wouIld
have to go out to competitive  bid; local suppliers were given  10% price preference; minimum levels of
local content wvere  set, and the import of used equipment was banned.
"  A qualified consortium had to contain at least one telephone operating company who had to
hold at least 10% of the consortium's  equity.  In addition the operator, a consortium had to continue
one (or at the most two) shareholder that held at least 20% of its shares.  The purpose of these
requirements was to ensure that at least 30% of the consortium's  equity was held by a maximum of
three  shareholders.  The operator, the additional shareholder (or two shareholders) with more than 20%,
of the equity, and any other shareholders holding more than  10% of the equity had to be able to
demonstrate that at the time of the prequalification that their assets exceeded US$  I billion. For local
firms whose membership was additional to the first 30%, this was reduced to  US$ 300 million.  All
members of the consortium with shareholdings above 10% were required to accept a joint  and several
obligation  for the payment of the sale price.  Changes in the composition of the consortium was
limited.  The consortium was required to delegate all management responsibilities to the operator, this
management contract was subject to review by the regulatory authority.
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were headed by Cable and Wireless, Nynex Corporation; Telefonica of Spain with' Citicorp and
Inversora Catalinas; Stet of Italy with J.P. Morgan; GTE Corporation; France Cables and Radio; and
Bell Atlantic Corporation with Manufacturers Hanover and Cititel.  All seven qualified to submit bids
in the final round of the sale.
'Fhe  three consortia that submitted bids were the consortium headed by Telefo'iica of' Spain.
the consortiumn  headed by Bell Atlantic of the U.S.; and the consortium headed by France Cable and
Radio with Stet of Italy.  Telefonlica and France Cable and Radio with Stet submitted bids for both the
northern and southern regions whlile Bell Atlantic bid only for the northern region.
Bids for Southern Region
1'elefonica  Stet and Cable et Radio
Cash  114  114
Argentine debt  2180  1944
Interest on debt  540  389
Total  2834  2447
Bids for Northern Region
Telefonica  Bell Atlantic  Stet and Cable
et Radio
Cash  100  100  100
Argentine debt  1850  1856  1750
Interest on debt  458  371  350
Total  2408  2337  2200
Although the Telefonica consortium submitted the highest bid for both regions, the sale
conditions  outlined in the Pliego did not permit the award of both companies to the same consortium.
As a result, Telefonica  was awarded the southern company and, once it had matched Telefonica's  bid,
Bell Atlantic was awarded the northern company.
As a regional operator  in the United States, Bell Atlantic was constrained in the size of its
foreign  investments.  U.S. regulations restricted its investment to 4.9% of the consortium.  Tc enable
Bell Atlantic to qua"fy  for the bidding process the Argentine government revised the terms of the
Pliego to reduce the minimum  size of the operator's  share to 4.9%.  This allowed Bell Atlantic's
higher bid to stay on the table.  However, Bell Atlantic had other difficulties.  The Argent.ne  members
of the consortium wanted Bell Atlantic to carry their share of the consortium's  investment, first at
40% and then at  15%.  13ell  Atlantic's  banker, Manufacturers Hanover, then had problems raising
enough Argentine debt to fulfil  Bell Atlantic's  bid.  Even though the government gave Bell Atlantic
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financing arrangements,  Manufacturers Hanover failed to amass enough sovereign debt and  Bell
Atlantic had to withdraw  its bid in early October. 3"
Following the procedures outlined in the Pliego, the privatization team then approached the
France Cable and Radio/Stet consortium.  The consortium was fornally  invited to enter negotiations
for the purchase of the northern company on October 4.  The consortium mobilized to deliver a bid of
US$  100 million  in cash and US$ 2,309 million in debt and interest; this was an increase of US$ 209
million  in debt and interest over the consortium's  original bid and nearly matched the failed bid of
Bell Atlantic.  The government accepted this bid and extended the deadline for taking possession of
the northern and southern companies by one month to November 8.  The consortium then had this
short period in which to make its financial arrangements. 34
The transfer contracts signed on November 8, 1990 transferred 60% of the shares in the
northern company, henceforth  known as Telecom Argentina, to the Nortel consortium operated by
France Cable and Radio and STET and 60% of the shares in the southern company, now known as
Telefonica  de Argentina, to the Cointel consortium operated by Telefonica of Spain.  The shareholding
of the these two consortia is in Table 6.  The government of Argentina retained 40% of the shares in
the two companies, 25% of which was to be sold to the general public, 5% to telephone cooperatives,
and  10% to ENTel workers.  The responsibility for  liquidating this holding remained with the
intervenor for ENTel.
The international and domestic public offerings of Telefonica's shares were made in the week
of December  12, 1991 while the offerings of the government's  shares in Telecom were made in the
week of March 23,  1992.  The 5% of the shares reserved for cooperatives was included in the
offering.  Cooperatives  were given priority  in the allocation of these shares, although there are no
indications that they took up their entire allocation.  Both offerings were oversubscribed and both
garnered much higher revenues than the US$ 300 million the government had anticipated.  The
December Telefonica sale brought in US$ 830 million while the March sale of Telecom brought in
US$  1,227 million.  The cash value of these 30% shareholdings turned out to be higher than the cash
value of the first 60% shareholdings the government had sold by tender. 35
The sale price of the first 60% of ENTel in November  1990 was US$ 214 million plus
US$ 5,029 million  of Argentine debt and associated interest at face value.  At the time of the
transaction this debt traded in the secondary market was worth  19 cents on the dollar or US$ 955
million.  Thus "ie equivalent cash value of the price paid for the first 60% of ENTel was US$ 1,169
3  Wall Street Journal, "Argentina Kicks Off Privatization Drive," June 26,  1990; La Nacion,  "Se
adjudico  Entel a Bell y a Telefonica," July 2,  1990, ard  "Postergan la firma para la cesion de Entel,"
August  13, 1990; and Wall Street Journal, "Argentina Cancels Sale of Phone Unit to U.S.-Led Group,"
October 8, 1990.
3  Decree 2096/1990; Telecom Argentina, Prospecto, March  1992, p.12; and La Nacion, "En una
tensajornada,  se ajudico al grupo STET la Zona Norte," October 8, 1990.
3  La Prensa, "Venden al publico el 25% de las acciones de ENTel," May 24,  1991.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICAT'IONS SECT'OR  Page 18
million:  US$ 630.8 million for the southern company that became Telefonica and US$ 538.7 million
for the northern company that became Telecom. 3"'
The arrangements for the  10 % of the shales reserved for WNTel workers were finallv puit in
place in December  1992.  The price was set at US$  16.6 million which is to be paid out of tlhe
dividends associated with the shares.  Until this payment to the government is made in fLull,  the shares
will be held by a trustee, the Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.
b. Privatization as a  Commitment Mechanism
Both the process of privatization and the resulting pattern of ownership can serve as
commitment  mechanisms.  The degree of transparency and predictability in the sale process is an
important signal of a government's  willingness and its ability to commit itself to providing a stable
regulatory environment post-privatization.  The resulting pattern of ownership may strengthen the
government's  commitment by creating new political constituencies who  identift  with the privatized
finns.
The signals created by the process of privatizing ENTel were mixed.  The basic procedures
which governed the bidding process were straight-forward and well-publicized  Rules were laid out
governing all steps of the bidding process and the bids were opened in public to eliminate any
suspicion that they might be fixed.  Not surprisingly, the haste in which the privatization of ENTel
was undertaken necessitated some technical clarifications o'  the bidding terms and conditions and
revisions to the bidding schedule, although ultimately the sale was completed with only a one month
delay beyond the deadline in the original schedule.  More seriously, some of the terms of the bid were
modified  in the course of the bidding process, or were not resolved until after the final bids had been
submitted.  Most of the modifications and uncertainty were related to the nature of the regulatory
regime and will be discussed in more detail in section five below.  In addition, in mid-April, one week
before the deadline to submit applications for prequalification the minimum asset levels that were
prerequisites for membership in the bidding consortiums were changed.  The effect of the modification
was to reduce the number of eligible operators and thereby reduce the number of consortia that could
qualify to bid.  At the same time, the changes increased the number of non-operator members who
would be eligible to join the bidding consortia.  It is unclear exactly what the motivation and origin of
these changes were, but they signalled an increase in risk and uncertainty attached to the purchase of
ENTel."  Another issue that was still unresolved at the time of the final bids was the status of CAT.
1  While the secondary market value of a dollar of Argentine sovereign debt was US$ 0.19, given
the imperfections of the market, this was not necessarily the social value to Argentina of the debt
repurchased.  For a more detailed discuission,  see Manuel Angel Abdala. Distributional Imnact
Evaluation of Divestiture in a High-inflation  Economy: The Case of ENTel Argentina  Ph.D.
Dissertation, Boston University, Boston: 1991, 25-36.
"  Decree 677/1990, April 11, 1990.  The prerequisite assets levels for the operator member of the
bidding consortium was increased from US$  I billion to US$ 1.5 billion.  At the same time the
minimum  asset level for members of the consortium who were outside the principal nucleus (that
included the operator  and one or two additional shareholders with a minimum shareholding together of
30%) was reduced from US$ 300,000 to US$ 200,000 for domestic members of the consortium andTHE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 19
CAT's  provincial licenses, whiich hiad  been precarious in nature, had expired and the territory that
CAT served was included in the new exclusive licenses that the government would provide to the two
new private telecommunications companies.  The Ministry of Public Works had been charged with the
responsibility for negotiating the purchase ot' CAT's assets, but failed to do so before the final bids
were submitted.  This meant that negotiations for the purchase of these assets did not take place unti!
after the award.
While the bidding process and the public offerings were openi to foreigni  bidders, the resuiltilng
ownership structure  includes a substantial participation by Argenitries.  Once the transfer of shares to
the workers has been completed, the division of shares between Argentinie and foreign slhareholders
will be the following:
Telecom  Telefonica
A. Domestic  43.0%  47.4%
* Diverse  18.0%  17.4%
* Concentrated  15.0%  20.0%
*  Employees  10.0%  10.0%
B. Foreign  57.0%  52.6%
*  Diverse  12.0%  12.6%
* Concentrated  45.0%  40.0%
100.0%  100.0%0
The concentrated domestic shareholders are the members of the consortia; these are banks and
influential industrial groups.  The diverse domestic shareholders are mostly individuals; together with
the workers they form a substantial bloc. Thle participation of Argentines in the shareholding of these
two companies  provides additional  insurance against regulatory expropriation of the companies'  assets.
The expropriation of Argentine nationals'  assets would not only be costly in terms of the govemment's
credibility as a regulator, but it would also generate direct political pressures that would reduce the
government's  chances of being re-elected.
In addition, the operators  of the two companies are either partially or entirely state-owned,
Telefonica by the government of Spain, STET by the government of Italy, and France Cables by the
French government.  The operators, therefore, have direct links with their home country governments
and the capacity to call on their support.
V. Regulation as a Commitment  Mechianism
from US$  I billion to US$ 500,000 for foreign members.  Altogether the members of the consortium
would have to have combined assets in excess of US$ 4 billion.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 20
The regulatory regime is critical to the telecommunications firms' operating environment.  The
pre-privatization  design and implementation  of regulation  affects potential buyers perception  of risk
and, therefore. the price the would be willing to offe-.  Post-privatization,  the regulatolr regimlie
continues to affect the buyers'  perception of risk and their investment behavior.  In the privatizalion of
ENTel, the most serious short-comings  have been in the pre- and post-privatization  iilplenieitationi  of
the regulatory regime. During the bidding  process,  regulatory  clarity was sacrificcd  to speed and to
politics. The Pliego outliied the basic rights arid  obligations  of the privatized  companies  and provided
for general regulatory principles  and the establishment  of a regiulator. However,  little wvas  done to
implement  this regime. It was not until more than a year after the privatization  that the governmenlt  of
Argentina  focussed  on the problems  of regulation  and took steps to address them. The discussion
below is divided into four sections:  (a) the pre-privatization  definition  and implementation  of the
regulatory regime, (b) the legal framework  tor the regulatory regime,  (c) the initial failure to
implement  to regulatory regime post-privatization,  and (d) the administrative  intervention  of CNT.
a. Pre-privatization  Definition and Implementation  of the Regulatory  Regime
The pre-privatization  definition  and implementation  of the regulatory regime was the weakest
part of the privatization process.  The regulatory regime was not defined until the very end of the
bidding process and substantial revisions took place during the bidding process.  These problems were
not entirely  accidental. At the beginning  of the bidding process  a conscious  decision was made by the
Argentine  government  to give priority to rapid completion  of the sale over the developr  lent of a
regulatory regime.  This reduced the number of political hurdles the privatization would have to clear.
This was an important strategic decision which recognized the potential for resistance to the
privatization.  The decision was contrary to the advice that the Argentine government had received
from the World Bank, which had urged the government to implement a regulatory regime before
privatizing.  However, in recognition of the importance of the post-privatization regulatory regime, the
Pliego did lay out both the basic rights and obligations of the privatizaed companies and the basic
principles and general concepts for regulation the telecommunications sector.  In addition an initial set
of pricing rules was set out and regulatory authority for the sector was conferred on the Secretary of
Communications in the Ministry of Public Works." 8
38  Rates were to be set prior to the presentation of offers to a level that would give "...an efficient
operator a reasonable rate of return on the fixed assets used to offer the service (paragraph  12.2 of the
original Pliego)."  In the initial two year transition period the licensee companiies would be permitted
to up-date their rates according to monthly changes in the consumer price index.  If during the period
of transition, these adjustments did not allow the licensee companies to achieve a rate of return of
16%, the companies would be allow to adjust their prices in order to achieve this level of return.
However, in the transition period, the real price of residential services would not be allowed to
increase in real terms except to maintain the relative price structure that existed at the time the assets
of ENTel were actually transferred to the licensee companies.  During the five year exclusive periods
the licensee companies would not be allowed to increase the overall price of their services (net of
connection charges) each year by more than the consumer price index minus 2%.  Meeting tilis
requirement was a prerequisite  'or an extension of the exclusive license for an additional three years.
In the last three years of the license, increases in the general price level of the licensee companies'
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The Secre,tariat  of Communicatiotns was also responsible fotr developing  a comprehelisive
regulatory  decree  based  oni  the principles  outlined in the Pliego. Hlowever, the Secretary  and  most
secretariat  staff did not support  the government's  privatization  plans  anc;  did not believe  that the
privatization team would succeed. As a result the Secretariat  of C1omm1Lullications  did not approach  the
task  of developing,  and implemeriing a regulatory  framework  witth any selise ot' urgency.  A lthoLigh
the Pliego had commnitted  the government  to issuing  the details  of the regLulatory  framilework  by
February  28, this decree  Nas not issued  unltil  June  22, 1990,  just before  final bids were to be
submitted. 39 The decree  :iad been  circulatinig  for some  time in draft forin, so its contents  were no
surprise  to the bidders,  bu. the government  did not commit itself until the last possible  miomiienit.  In
addition, the delay in issuing  ti,e decree  meant  that no steps  had  been  taken  to implemenit  the
regulatory  regime defined by the decree. Thus,  the bidders  had no information as  to who would run
the regulatory  agency  and  how it would be staffed. After the decree  was issued,  the secretariat  took
no action to implement  the decree. Not until after the privatizationi  was  completed  did the Secretariat
of Communications  suddenly  move to transform  itself into the regulatory  agency. The same  cast  of
characters  that had run the secretariat  and had  chosen  not to support  privatization now would run the
agency. (Their role in implementing  the rc  -ulatory  regime  is discussed  in more detail in the
subsection  below.)
Additional regulatory uncertainty  was ..,troduced  by the modification of the original pricing
rules by a subsequent  executive  decree,  liii iting the rate base  on which minimum rate of return was
guaranteed  for the newly privatized companies first two years  of operations. The original rules for
deternining the tariff  levels  had been  based  on the privatization team's estimate  that together  the
licensee  companies  would need  at least  US$ 500 million a year -1 fund the obligatory investment
program  outlined in the Pliego.  The team was  concernied  that the licensee  companies  would have
difficulty  raising this amount  of capital either domestically  of from foreign sources.  They therefore
planned  to design  the tariff  regime  to provide at least  this amount  of net income. Based  on the
minimum rate of return of 16% provided  for in the original Pliego,  this would require  a combined  rate
base  of US$ 3.2 billion.
However,  as required  by the State  Reform Law, the National Development  Bank (Banco
Nacional de Desarrollo) had  prepared  an independent  valuation  of ENTel's assets  which was
completed  on February  27, 1990. This valuation set  the value  of ENTel's assets  as US 1.9  billion. 4 '
Opposition  arose  in Congress  to allowing a rate base  of US$ 3.2 billion dollars when  the assets  of)
Connection  charges  were limited to 50% of the direct cost  of the line for residential  services  and
100%  of the direct cost  for other services. During the transition  period the connection  charge wvould
be treated  like a te!ephone  tariff.  After that the charge  would not be a charge,  but rather a loan from
the user  to the ;ompany with a five year term and interest  rate of 7% per annum. At the end  of the
exclusive  period the regulatory  agency  would only continue  to regulate  rates  in those  parts of the
country where there was no competition.
"  Decree  1185/1990.  This decree  was  drafted  by a joint Argentine/World Bank team.
40 Law 23,696,  Article  19, August 17, 1989  and Decree  420, February  28, 1990.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTcOR  Page 22
ENrTeI  were valued  at US$  1.9 billion. 4'  It was also argued that the iminimium  price wvas  too low.
President Menemti  was pressured by mcmbers of hiis  own party to isstue  decrees limiting the rate base to
US$ 1.9 billion plus the licensee companies'  additional investments and to increase the milnitimlil bid
to include US$ 3.5 billion in total of Argentine governmenit debt.  '[ll  incrcase in thle millimum bid
was made in a March 28 executive decree and the reductioll in the rate base wvas  incorporated in thle
April  11, 1990 executive decree modifyinig  the Pliego, one week before the deadline tor submission of
application for prequalification. 42 T  he privatization team opposed these chaniges  and as a result there
was speculation that the intervenior would be dismissed bzy  President Meneni1. ler  chief advisor did
resign from the team in protest over the chanige in the rules governing the privatization.  Iflowever, as
the bidding process came to closure, it became evident that the few remainilng bidders were focuissed
on the actual tariff  levels at the time of the transfer and not on the minimum level of return provided
for in the original Pliego.
The issue of the effective tariff level was still unlresolved at the June 25,  1990 deadline for
final bids and may have been a factor in the small number of bids received.  Indeed the tariff issue
was not resolved until after the awards had been made.  On March 7 the intervenor had given the base
rate for the tariff and the indexing mechanism for adjusting the tariff  'evels with inflation.  As with
most indexing formulas in use in Argentina, the adjustments were to begin in the following month.  In
this case the first adjustment would have been in April.  Howvever,  the inflation rate for the mnonth  of
March was 95% and the bidders wanted this accounted for in the tariff level.  The government resisted
this increase, but the bidders had persisted and the issue had not been resolved.  The differerice was
reflected in the price of the basic unit used for calculating telephone charges; the govenmient position
was that the rate should be 193 australes per pulse (about 3 cents) while the bidders formula gave a
price of 293 australes per pulse.
The two companies argued that such a rate was necessary to ensure their profitability and
threatened to withdraw  if it was not approved.  On the government side, the Minister of Public Works
threatened to resign  if the government Allowed  the price increase.  lowever. the government hiad very
little bargaining power.  It was running into its self-iriposed  deadline ai,d had no alternative bidders to
go to if the Telefonica and France Cable and Radio/STE-F  consortiunis s%iihdrcw.  H-olding  a firni line
may have meant the failure of the privatization of ENTel."
The final agreemenf on the pulse price. which wvas  incorporated in the two transter  contracts
signed on November 8, 1990 was oni  an indexing fornula  that produced a tariff  of 247.9 australes per
'  The focus of this opposition was the Comision Bicameral of the Congress that wkas  overseeing
the implementation of the State Reform Law.
L  La Nacion,  "Defendio NMaria  J. Alsogaray la privatizacion de Entel." March  12, 1990(  L-a
Nacion, "Se modificaron  los pliegos de xventa  de FIntel  N de Acrolinieas."  April 2.  1990: f-inanicial
TimeLs,  "Crossed  lines over privatisation," Mam  25.  1990;  [)ecree 575. March 28.  1990: and Decree
677/90, April  11, 1990.
4  Wall Street Journal, "Privatization  Camiipaigin  in Argentina 13ogs  DoNkn,"  October 25,  1990 and
La Nacion.  "Entel: el Gobierno  opto por flexibilizar valores" and "El pulso teleftoico  ajLustado  por
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pulse (approximately 4.8 cents US).  This change in the pricing regime had a !arge irrpact Ot;
consumers.  For private consumers this resulted in an real increase ot' 96.57%  in the pulse price
relative to their previous bi-monthly  bill.  In return the twte consortia gave up their rights for the
minimum return of  16% on their rate base.  This, however, was not much of a sacrifice, since the
definition  of the rate base had been dramatically narrowed in the April modifications of the Pliego.""
Problems in the definition and implemenitation  of the regulatory regime before the privatization
were followed by more problems  in the iniplementation of the regime after privatization.  The next
section outlines the main components of the regulatory framework.  Then the following section
discusses the post-privatization  implementation of the regulatory regime.
b. The Regulatory  Framework
The June 22,  1990 regulatory decree provided the legal basis for a regulatory agency and
regime.  Although long delayed, the decree provided a well-designed  legal framework.  It included and
extended the regulatory principles outlined in the Pliego and created a telecommunications regulatory
agency, the Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CNT).  CNT was to be headed by five
commissioners, all of whom would be appointed by the executive and, as required by the Argentine
constitution, all of whom could be removed by the president.  The executive would also designate one
of the commissioners as president of the commission.  The commissioners would be nominated for
five year terms and could be renominated  for one additional term.  CNT had the authority to make
decisions  wvithin  the parameters set by the degree, but parties could appeal CNT decisions to the
national executive.
CNT's primary sources of funding were to be a tax of 0.5% on telecommunicat;;ans revenuLes
and the license charges to users of the radio spectrum.  These funds were to be deposited in an
account at the Bank of Argentina and administered by CNT.  Any funds not used by CNT in
performing  its assigned tasks were to be used to develop both public and official telecommunications
and broadcasting services.
CNl's  filnction was defined to be (i) administrative and technical regulation and (ii) control.
supervision, and verification consistent withi  applicable norms and government policy.  The objective
of CNT was to assure the continuity, regularity. equality and broad availability' of' service, to promote
the universal nature of the basic telephone service at a fair and reasonable price, and to promote the
development  of competitive services. 45 CNT's powers and responsibilities included: (i) granting and
revoking licenses, authorizations, and permits beside t'iose corresponding to the exclusive regimes
granted as part of the privatization of ENTel; (ii) deciding whether the exclusive regimes should be
4  ENTel, Region Norte, Contrato de 'Transferencia, Section  16; ENTel, Region Sur, Contrato de
Transferencia, Section  16; Abdala,  1991, p. 59.; Telecom Argentina, Prospecto, March  1992, p. 22;
and Telefonica de Argentina. US Offerin,e Prospectus. December 1991, p.33.
4  In Chapter  8 of the Pliego basic telephone service was defined  as the provision of fixea
telecommunications links that form par, of the public telephone network or that are connected to such
network and provide diIC  miicans  for urban, interurban and international live voice telephone services.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 24
extended; (iii)  inspection and verification as to whether the conditions contained  in the licenses.
authorizations and permits  were met; (iv) the review and approval of' investmenit plans for operational
compatibility, minimum quality of service, and  interconinection .f  networks as well as tile standards
and rules for interconnectioni; (v) the resolutioni ot' consumer complaints; (vi) preventing anti-
competitive behavior, particularly as a result of cross-subsidies; (vii)  verification that requirements for
competitive  procurement were met; and (viii) approving tariffs in cases where rates must follow
guidelines set in a license.  The sanctions that CNT could apply, in addition to those defined  in the
Pliego for the exclusi-e  regime, included warnmigs, fines, total or partial cancellation of exclusivity,
and the cancellation of licenses, authorizations, or pennits.  Decisionis  of CN'T'  would be deemTied  to
have exhausted the administrative appeal process except for appeal to the national executive brancih.
The decree also extended the Pliego's outline of regulatory procedures and policies.  These
included the following.  New entianits were regulated by thie  requirement that the provision of
telecommunications  services would be subject to the prior procurement of a license.  Supply was
regulated  by the requirement that an authorization  be obtained before new facilities could be installed
or operated.  While CNT had the power to grant licenses that would be subject to future competition,
the power to grant exclusive licenses was reserved to the executive branch of the national government.
Tariffs  were to be published and available.  All accounting and cost information required by
licenses were to be supplied to CNT along with any other  information the commission might
reasonably require.  Interconnection rules for the two companies with exclusive licenses were governed
by the terms of the Pliego, which required interconnection between regions and with independent
operators.  The licensee societies were also required to provide non-discriminatory access to their
networks to the providers of data services and other value-added services. In the first instance, the
terms were to be negotiated between the interconnecting parties without the involvement of CNT.
However, if there were a dispute CN'I' could be invited to intervene, or in any case CNT may
intervenie  of its own accord to set prices or conditions of service.  Beyond the period and scope of the
exclusive licenses, interconinection  was to be open between all technically compatible equipment and
networks on a non-discriminiatorv prices and levels of services.  As with the exclusive regime, the
interconnectinig parties were to negotiate their own conditions and prices with the potential for CNT
intervention.
Although in its details the regulatory framework was well-designed, its implemenitationi  was
problematic.  These problems are outlined in the following section.
c. The Initial Failure to Implement tlhe Regulatory Regime Post-privatization
Initi!  'y, the regulatory agency did little to put the framework outlined by the regulatory
decree into action.  Thus. although a well-defined regulatory framework was legally in place,
regulatory practice did not conform to the framework.  This created an ambiguous setting for all the
participants in the telecommunications sector.  After more than a year of inactivity and mounting
uncertainty. the Menem administration replaced the m-nagement of the agency.
The first  incarnation of CNT was staffed entirelv by former employees of the Secretariat of
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president of the commission.  This group, besides having no experience in regulation and little vision
as io ihe roie of a reguiator,  were not associated with the moderate portion of the Peronist party that
backed reform  and had not supported the privatization nor expected it to succeed.  At the last moment,
as the first stage of the privatization was completed, the Secretariat of Communications had set about
transfonring  itself into a regulator in November 1990.
Then in early  1991, the Ministry of Public Works was merged with the Ministry of the
Economy.  This brought CNT under the purview of the new Minister of the Economy, who, as
inflation has begun to accel  rate again, had taken office at the end of January.  The new min1ister's
priority  was to restore macro-stability in Argentina, which he tackled by introducing a convertibility
plan on March 20.  In this context, the reorganization of the merged department was a secondary
concern.  As a result, the functions of CNT' received little attention from the minister.  However, the
commissioners and staff of CNT were clearly not members of the minister's  economic team.  As
outsiders, they were not trusted and the ministry severely limited CNT's  access to the funds raised by
the special tax of 3.5% established to support CNT's activities.
Although it was charged with an enormous regulatory responsibility, CNT did little between
November  1990 and the end of 1991.  No clear regulatory processes were developed and a backlog of
decisions  began to pile up.  There was an absence of experienced staff and a lack of resources to hire
any additional  staff or even pay existing staff on a regular basis.  CNT's failure to perform had an
negative impact on all parts of the telecommunications sector.  In issues where it should have played
an active role it seems to have played none.  The most significant example was in the revision of the
tariff  formula that took place as a result of the introduction of the new convertibility law. This law
was formulated in response to the accelerating inflation at the beginning of  1991.  Its main component
was the introduction of a new currency. the peso, that would be worth  10,000 australes and the fixing
of the exchanige  rate at one peso equal to one US dollar.  Another part of the law banned all price
indexing formulas that were linked to the Argentine CPI.  This made the telecommunications tariff
indexing formula void.
The ban on the indexing formula meant that the nominal price of telephone services was
frozen and subject to erosion by inflation.  Under the terms cf the Pliego and transfer agreements, any
modification of the terms of the exclusive license was subject to indemnification.  Yet the response of
CNT was to do nothinig.  Its president was quoted in the press as saying that although the tariffs were
frozen, they were high enough. 46 Needless to say, the CNT's  unwillingness to replace the indexing
formula in the Pliego reduced the credibility of its commitment to the rule of law.
Eventually the issue was resolved because the companies refused to participate in the
preparation of the prospectuses for the public sale of the government's  remaining shares in the
cornpanies.  This brought the government to the negotiating table.  However, the negotiations took
place between the companies and the Ministrv of the Economy and Public Works, not with CNT.  The
new formula -- which was agreed upon on November 28,  1991 -- fixed the tariff  levels in UJS  dollars
and permitted an adjustment every six months based on the CPI in the United States.  This allowed for
adjustment of tariffs, but exposed the companies to the risk that the inflation rates in the US and
46  La Prensa, "La tarifa telefonica esta congelada, ya que es alta y remunerativa," April 7, 1991.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUJNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 26
Argentina  would diverge. 4"  Firms were also given permission to begin rebalancirig the relative rates
between different classes of users in January of  1992.  In addition they were allowed to keep the
connection charge, which was to have been replaced with a debt  instrument, but they were required to
meet a schedule that would reduce the charge to US$ 250 for all users by November  1997.48
CNT's  sluggishness or failure to act caused problems in many other parts of' the
telecommunications sector as well.  T  he six-month delay in CNT's response to CAT's  tariff  increase
request greatly complicated CAT's  negotiations with Telefonica and Telecom for the sale of CAT's
properties.  This delay occurred even though the requested tariffs were 40% below the tariffs in effect
for Telecom and Telefonica.  CNT also failed to begin addressing the imbalance in rates between
local, long distance, and international service.  Local service is subsidized by high long distance and
international rates.  This causes distortion in usage patterns and creates artificial incentives for new
firms to enter  the long distance and international markets to "cream-skim."  Indeed, it appears the
American telephone companies had been selling their international credit calling cards door-to-door
illegally in Argentina.  CNT's  failure to police the telecommunications sector left the two licensed
operators  susceptible to the loss of a significant portion of their international revenue to these illegal
sales.
The development of new telecommunications services was retarded by CNT's  failure to
develop standards and processes for issuing licenses.  The development of these services also suffered
from a pricing policy that treated them as end-user business customers, despite the fact that little use
was made of existing telephone company infrastructure.  This made most of these services
uneconomic.  Meanwhile, a number of radio operators and telephone cooperatives, faced with a delay
in receiving licenses and little or no policing of their operations, started operations without licenses.
Conisumers suffered from CNT's  inability to effectively address customer service complaints.
This undermined the reputations of the companies, who relied on CNT to arbitrate complaints.
The two licensee companies claimed to have exceeded the performance targets set for them
under their contracts.  However, CNT did not have the capacity to verify these claims, allowing, on
one hand, the possibility of cheating by the companies and, on the other hand, increasing the risk that
the companies would not be able to prove that they had met the targets and so were entitled to retain
their licenses.  This situation was further complicated by the fact the CNT had no input into the
telephone companies'  development 'f  their internal information systems.  This presented a potential
handicap of the re  ,ulator's  ability to review and verify whether the companies were meeting their
performance targets.
CNT's  methods of decision-making were also problematic.  Rather than following an open and
transparent  process based on a clear set of rules with public analysis and comment, decisions were
more idiosyncratic and made on the basis of personal relationships.  This type of behavior increased
4  In fact there has been such a divergence.  In 1992 the increase in the U.S. CPI was 3 %o  while
the increase in the Argentine equivalent was 25 %.
"  Decree 2585/91.  In November  1992, the connection charge for commercial and professional
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the risk associated with investing in the telecommunications sector.  The regulator had been endowed
with a broad range of responsibilities and powers and yet amions were unpredictable.  Without well-
defined regulatory rules and procedures the risk of making capital investments in the sector was
increased, not only for the two licensee companies, but also for the providers of new services and
consumers.  This higher level of risk reduced the incentives to invest in the sector.
CNT's  poor performance also had implications outside of the telecommunications sector.  It
also undermined the credibility of the government of Argentina's  privatization program, both
domestically and abroad.  Telecommunications had been intended to be one of the flagship examples
of the government's  intention to transform the economy.  'rhe government had succeeded in
transferring ownership  of the sector to the private sector.  However, it had failed to complete the
privatization  by implementing an effective regulatory regime.  'T'his  failure was a bad signal as to the
potential surcess of other privatizations.  Without clear, universally applied, rules for the conduct of
business after privatization, investors would be reluctant to participate in the process.  Likewise,
without a regulator to safeguard their interests as consumers, Argentineans would oppose the
privatization of other government monopolies.
By the end of 1991 a consensus had emerged amongst the parties involved in the Argentine
telecommunications sector regarding the need for a more effective regulator.  Newly formed consumer
advocacy groups viewed regulation as an avenue for improving the quality of telephone service and
for assuring fair pricing.  Both actual and potential new services providers needed clarification of the
ground  rules for operations  in the sector.  Even the two licensee companies, who might have been
expected to profit from inefficient regulation, realized that the legal and political uncertainties
associated with ineffective regulation could be costly for them.
d.  The Administrative  Intervention of CNT
In December  1991, the Subsecretariat of Communications was recreated in the Ministry of
Economy and Public Works and a new Subsecretary of Communications was appointed.  This
appointment  brought CNT under closer scrutiny by the government.  In January 1992, the government
instituted an administrative  intervention of CNT, replacing its commissioners with an intervenor and
four sub-intervenors.  The catalyst for this  intervention was a World Bank report that highlighted the
deficiencies of the regulatory agency.  Unlike the commissioners they replaced, the intervenors were
associated with the political coalition supporting economic reform and, perhaps more importantly, with
the Minister of Economy and Public Works.  Although the executive branch had the power to dismiss
the commissioners outright,  it chose not to do so because of the bad precedent it would create.  It
chose instead to use an administrative intervention to signal that this was an exceptional situation.
Administrative interventions are used in extraordinary cases, generally where mismanagement has
taken place, and are by their nature temporary.  Initially, the intervention  of CNT was for twelve
months, but was renewable.
'I'he objective of the intervention was to reform CNT into an effective regulator.  In
collaboration  with the World Bank, the Subsecretariat for 'I'elecommunications formulated a  plan for
developing CNT's  regUlatory capacity.  After an international competition. the government selected an
independent inteniational consulting team to assist it in implementing the reform.  The role of the
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policies; in designin2 the fuinctions, methods, procedures and svstems that CNT would use; in the
implementation of the systems and procedures; and in evaluating and fine-tuning this implementation.
The new management of CNT was faced with two competing tasks: (i) to address in the short
term the pressing backlog of regulatory decisions and (ii) to chart out CNT's  future strategy for the
long term and obtain the hiuman  and financial resources necessary to implement this strategy.  In the
first six months of the intervention the short-term issues dominated CNT's  agenda at the expense of
the long term development of the commission.  This may have been inevitable given the backlog of
decisions left by the CNT's  inaction in its first year, but it increased the risk that with the departure of
the intervenors that CNT would revert to its previous ways.
By October  1992, CNT had  issued licenses regularizing the status of  140 of the 300
independent telephone cooperatives and expected to complete the balance by the end of the year.  It
had initiated the bidding process for mobil telephone service in the regions outside of Buenos Aires.
It had established the norms for domestic data transmission services, video conferencing, and private
mobile radio, all of which are provided on a competitive basis.  In order to promote competition in the
provision of cellular telephones,  it had ended regulations requiring partial fabrication in Argentina and
allowed any equipment approved by the US Federal Communications Commission to be used in
Argentina.
It established norms for the use of the radio spectrum and resumed monitoring to ensure that
these norms were respected.  It dramatically improved the collection of charges for the use of the radio
spectrum.  Up until the end of  1991 CNT had collected the equivalent of US$ 2.880 000 in charges; in
the fir,t eight  months of 1992 it collected more than lJS$  10 million.  CNT had also initiated the
process for selling one of the two satellite slots allocated to Argentina for domestic satellite
communications.  This process was completed in early  1993.  To facilitate the collection, processing,
and monitoring of consumer complaints, CNT signed a contract with a consumer advocacy group
(Adelco).  A decree drafted in collaboration with the licensee companies and defining the rights and
obligations of consumcrs was issued on August  11, 1992 and went into effect on September  11,
1  992.49
Despite its progress on these many fronts, CNT's  initial actions did not reduce the legal and
political uncertai.1ty the regulatory regime had created for the licensee companies.  Rathier CNT's
intervenors added to this uncertainty.  This group appears to have been motivated by firm beliefs in
the value of economic liberalization and competition.  While respecting the core of tile licensee
companies'  exclusive licenses for the provision of the basic telephone service. CNT took steps that
eroded the companies'  rights at the margin.  In one instance, CN  T  issued decrees that would permit
the creaticn of a competing long distance service linked to the future cellular licensees.  These decrees
were issued without any waming to or discussion with Telecom and Telefonica. who h1ave  appealed
them  to the national executive.  The issue is still up in the air, but the government has appointed an
arbitrator to resolve the dispute. 50
4  Cited in a presentation made by the Sub-secretary of Communications. Dr. Germia
Kammerrath, at the World Bank in Washington, I).C.. October 23.  1992.
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While the licensee companies argued that the terms of thc Pliego entitled them to the second
cellular  license, CNT did not agree."  Instead the granting of the second cellular license was linked to
reductions  in off-peak  long distance rates and an acceleration by one year of the schedule for reducing
connection rates that had been negotiated in December 1991.  'I'lTe  decrease in the rates ranged  from
9% to  17%, depending on the time and distance of a call.  The approximate cost to each company,
calculated as a net present value of the reduction over a five year period. was US$ 145.6 million.
Another  issue that is yet to be resolved is the technically difficult and politically awkward
issue of the rebalancing of rates. T'he degree of subsidy from long distance and intemnational  service to
local service is so large that while 75% of calls in Argentina are local, only 25% of the system's
revenues are derived from local services.  T'his high level of imbalance creates pressures to illegally
by-pass the network and creates political pressures from would-be providers who wish to enter the
markets for  long distance and international services.  While rebalancing is a politically difficult issue,
the terms of the Pliego permit the operators to rebalance their prices, so long as the overall level of
tariffs is not increased.  Telecom and Telefonica are anxious to initiate this process so that by the time
their exclusive license ends, their rates will more accurately reflect the costs of providing service.
Meanwhile, CNT's  long term development remains to be addressed.  The top staff of CNT are
political and could leave at any time.  To ensure continuity the commission needs to create positions,
improve compensation, and recruit and retain skilled staff.  It also needs to develop  its internal
systems and procedures.  The team of outside consultants working with CNT since May has made
progrss in developing strategies and procedures.  However, implementation relies on CNT's ability to
obtain permission from the executive branch of the government to exempt CNT staff from civil service
restrictions on pay.
CNT's  long term effectiveness will also depend on  its access to financial resources.  Its current
budget is approximately  US$ 27 million which is only a part of the revenues it generates.  According
to the decree that created the commission, CNT is supposed to control its own revenues and those
revenues not used to fund the agency are supposed to be applied to the development of the
telecommunications sector.  However, in reality, CNT''s access to funds is controlled by the Minister
of Economy and  Public Works and any surplus in applied to the public debt.
Despite these unresolved issues, it appears that the prognosis is good for CNT's  role as an
effective regulator.  Staff and processes are now in place and should continue to function.  Although
incremental change may take place over time, a dramatic change in CNT's  character seems
increasingly unlikely.
While regulatory uncertainty was high during the privatization process and in the year
following privatization, improvements have been made since the administrative intervention of CNT.
The current management of CNT has been able to begin implementing the legal framewNork  for
regulation.  Although much remains to be done to complete the implemiienitationi  of the regulatory
framework,  as the evidence presented in the next sections shows. the initial indications are good.
"  The Pliego is imprecise as to the specific terms under which the licensee companies skould be
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VI. Preliminary  Evidence Regarding Credibility and Sustainability
Barely more than two years has passed since the privatization of ENTel and the evidence
regarding the credibility and sustainability of the regulatory regime and the implications for the
performnance  of the telecommunications sector is scant.  However, the evidence that is available
suggests that, while uncertainty  in the telecommunications sector may have been high at the time of
privatization,  it appears to have dropped since then.  Indeed it appears that the reputation of Argentina
as a country has improved and that both foreign and domestic investors are increasingly optimistic
about the country's economic  future. Two types of evidence  are reviewed  here, evidence  related to
the perception  of credibility  and sustainability  in the telecommunications  sector  and evidence  related  to
perceptions  of the potential  for continued success  in the government's economic  reform program  and
Argentina's  economic future.  In the first category evidence on the level of bidder interest in the first
stage of the privatization, the returns earned by investors in the privatized companies, and the
investment behavior of the companies are presetued.  In the second category evidence from the stock
market, the secondary market for Argentine sovereign debt, and new foreign investment flows are
presented.
Initial buyer interest in the privatization of ENTel was strong, but dropped off rapidly during
the bidding process.  14 potential purchasers bought the bidding documents for IJS$ 20,000 each.
However, only seven consortia applied for prequalification on April  19, 1990.  (All of whom
qualified.)  In the end only three bidders submitted final bids for the two new telecommunications
firms on June 25, 1990 and one of the three then dropped out.12 This attrition was correlated with
modifications to the bidding process and uncertainty over the tariff  levels at the time of transfer.  The
drop from  14 to 7 potential bidders took place just  after the tariff regime and the prerequisites for
prequalification  had been changed.  In addition, while the Pliego hiad committed the government to
issue a detailed regulatory decree by February  18, 1990, no such decree had been issued.  The drop
from 7 to 3 then to 2 bidders took place at the end of the bidding process, when the regulatory
framework had been clarified, but the starting tariff  ievel (and therefore the potential profitability of
the privatized companies) was still uindefined. The fall in the numbcr of biddcrs appears to be a
reflection of the level of uncertainty in the privatization process.  The fall reduced the level of
competition  and the government's  leverage in the final round of bargaining; presumably, it therefore
reduced the price offered for the two operating companies in the first stage of the privatization.
Changes in the ,.ice  offered for the two operatinig  companies between the first round of
bidding and the general public offerings reflect changes in the buyers' assessment of the risks involved
in the purchase.  The Telefonica consortia paid US$ 114 million in cash and US$ 2,720 in Argentine
sovereign debt and interest for the Southern operating company.  The Telecom consortia paid US$  100
million  in cash and US$ 2,309 in debt and  interest for the Northern company.  At the time of the
transaction this debt traded in the secondary market was worth  19 cents on the dollar.  Thus the
52  One of th_ these consortia was formed through the merger of the STET and  France Cables
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equivalent cash value of the price paid for the southiern company was US$ 630.8 million and US$
538.7 million was the cash equivalent for the northern company."
The market's  assessment of this risk seems to have decreased dramatically  by thic  time of the
public offering of the second tranche of Telefonica in I)ecember  1991 and of 'ITelecoIm  in March  1992.
Investors paid US$ 830 million for 30% of Telefonica and US$  1,227 mnillion  for 30% of Telecoin.
Adjusting for the size of the two blocks of shares, the price paid for Telefonica de Argentinia's shares
in the public offering  was 3.6 times the price paid by the its operating consortiumn. The price paid  in
the public offering of T'clecom's shares was 4.5 times the price paid by the 1'elecom operating
consortium.  Accordingly, the return to the investors who bought shares in the secondary offering  is
lower than that earned by the investors in the first tranche of the privatization.  This implies that the
risk premia demanded by investors in this sector declined and while the perception of credibility and
sustainability seems to have improved over time. 54
This apparent increase in credibility and sustainability is consistent with Telefonica and
Telecom's  investment behavior.  Both companies have exceeded the investment levels required under
the terms of their licenses.  Their actual investments and their investment plans are outlined in Table
9.  (The table also shows the number of lines the companies must install each year to meet its
performance targets.)  Telefonica invested US$ 208.6 million in its network  in the eleven months up
to September 30,  1991 and an additional US$ 615.2 million in the following year.  Telecom, which
started with a slightly smaller network, invested US$ 132.0 million in its first eleven months and
US$ 609.0 million the following year."  Most of these funds were internally generated, but both
companies have undertaken borrowings to finance investment and working capital.  Their ability to
borrow is an indication of lenders'  optimism regarding the future of the sector. 56
This investment was directed towards improving the quantity and quality of services available.
Telefonica added 66,176 lines to its network in the eleven months up to September 30,  1991 and
5  While the secondary market value of a dollar of Argentine sovereign debt was $0.19, given the
imperfections of the market, this was not necessarily the social value to Argentina of the debt
repurchased.  For a more detailed discussion, see Manuel Angel Abdala, Distributional Impact
Evaluation of Divestiture in a High-inflation  Economy: 'I'he Case of ENTel Argentina, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Boston University, Boston: 1991, 25-36.
5  While the price for the workers'  10% of the companies'  shares was set in late  1992, it was
linked to the price paid for the first traniche of the privatization and therefore does not reflect changes
in market perceptions.
5  As of September 30,  1992 Telefonica had paid out a cumulative amount of US$ 115 million  in
dividends, while over the same period Telecom had paid out US$ 51 million.  These are small
amounts relative  to the level of investment.
56  Telecom increased it debt by US$ 74.9 million in  1992 and Telefonica  increased its debt by
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276,364 lines in 1992.  Telecom added 50,809 and 221,941 lines respectively. '  In the five years
leading up to the privatization, ENTel had added 98,000 lines a year on average to the entire  systernm.
Further to these net additions to their networks, both companies invested in digitalizinig their mainly
electromagnetic  systems.  In total, 1'elecom installed 420,370  lines in 1992.  Of thcse, 401,272  lines
wvere  digital and  198,429 were replacement lines.  'I'eleftonica  increased the digitalizationi of its network
from  18.1% in Septcmber  1991 to 24.0% in September  1992.
Investors'  general perceptions of the prospects for private investlent  in Argentinia seem very
positive as demonstrated by the performance of the stock market and the increase in foreigil direct
investment.  The market index has increased from a value of 23.70 at the end of May 1989 to
13,279.43 on March  19, 1993 (after peaking in mid-1992).  The evolution of the stock market index is
illustrated in Figure 9.  (Changes in the prices of Telefonica and 1'elecom's  stock have roughly
paralleled the movement in the market.)  Foreign direct  investment in Argentina has more tilan
doubled between  1989 and  1992.  According to the IMF, foreign direct investment flows to Argentina
were approximately  US$  1.0 billion in 1989, US$ 2.0 billion  in 1990, and US$ 2.5 in 1991.  The level
of investment in 1992 is estimated to be an additional US$ 2.4 billion.
Overall perceptions of the health of the Argentine economy, as evidenced by the value of
Argentine sovereign debt in the secondary markets, also have improved since the implementation of
the reform program.  The quoted value on the dollar of Argentine debt on May 22,  1989 was 13 cents,
by March  1, 1993 this had improved to 46 cents. 59 The evolution of the secondary market for
Argentine  debt is illustrated in Figure  10.  The conclusion of the Brady plan arrangements on April 7,
1993 gave another boost to confidence.
Thus, although the initial perceptions of risk in the telecommunications sector seem to have
been high, they appear to have fallen over time as the privatization was implemented and the
regulatory regime developed.  The reduction in risk has been accompanied by substantial investment
by the two newly privatized companies.  At the same time the overal! reform program has succeeded,
not only  in improving Argentina's economic performiance, but also In improving expectations
regarding the country's  economic future.
This evidence indicates that the privatization of ENTel and the reform program of whichi it
was a part was a success.  1However,  there are some qualifications.  With the benefit of hindsight, there
are some actions that the Argentine government might have taken to improve the outcome of the
privatization and there are some actions the government may still wish to take to this end.  The e are
discussed in the following section.
S  These are the numbers reported by the companies and have not yet been verified by CNT.
5  While it is possible to comipare ENTel's physical level of investment with that of the two new
companies,  it is not meaningful to compare their levels of expenditure.  ENTel paid much higher
pricc.s for its equipment and appears to have been less efficient in installing it.
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VII. An Evaluation  of Regulation  and Commitment  in Argentina
Thus far, Argentina's  success in establishing a credible and sustainable regLiatory regime has
been mixed.  The evidence cited above indicates that the initial level of uncertainty in the reform and
privatization process was very high and that this resulted in investors demanding high risk premia.
This reduced  the government's  ability to capture the benefits from privatizing  ENTel. These risk
premia seem to have declined  as the government  made progress  in implementing  its regulatory regime
and the rest of the economic  reform program. 60 However,  there remain a few actions that the
government  of Argentina may wish to undertake  to improve  the credibility  and sustainability  of its
telecommunications  regulation. In addition,  Argentina's experience  suggests  some recommendations
for other countries which are considering  privatizing  their telecommunications  systems.
One means by which the Argentine  government  could improve  the credibility  of the existing
regulatory regime would be to enshrine  it in iegislation. The government  chose to use executive
decrees to define and create the regulatory  regime because  of the ease and speed with which this could
be done.  While these were positive attributes  during the privatization  process,  they are now negative
attributes. With a change in administration  the regulatory framework  easily could be changed or
abolished. Legislation  would be more difficult  to change as this would require cooperation  between
tht Congress  and the Executive. The current administration  could take advantage  of the fact that it
has a majority in both cha ibers of Congress  to enact legislation  incorporating  the current regulatory
system.
Budgetary  independence  probably  is not realistic for CNT.  However,  the problem wi,h the
current budgetary practice is that it is contrary to the provisions of the regulatory decree.  The decree
provides for a tax on telecommunications services to fund the activities of CNT and CNT is supposed
to control all the revenues form this tax.  In reality the funds are controlled by the Treasury and the
CNT must obtain the permission of the Minister of Economy and Public Works to access these funds.
This behavior on the part of the Argentine government does not increase confidence that it will abide
by its own rules.  These budgetary arrangements should be regularized.
Another change which Argentina eventually may wish to consider would be to modify the
appeal mechanism.  In the current regime appeals are made to the Executive rather than to the
Judiciary.  Given the general lack of confidence in the judicial  system this may be the most
appropriate mechanism for the time being.  However, appeal to the Executive has a number of
drawbacks.  First, it removes the possibility of checks and balances b tween the different  branches of
government.  Second, given that judicial  appointments are in theory lifetime appointments and the
president's  term is limited to six years, the judiciary  should be a more stable institution.  Finally, it
presumes expertise on the part of the Executive that it may not possess. 6 '  Argentina has initiated a
60  Because other economic reforms have taken place over the period, separating the increase in
confidence due to  improvements in regulation in the telecommunications sector and  improvements due
to progress in overall reform  is problematic.
6  Although in a recent appeal the Executive appointed an arbitrator  with expertise in the field to
handle the case.THE ARCENTINE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS SEC'I'OR  lPage  34
program  for judicial  reforimi. Once this refornn has become effective, thc governimient  ot' Argentina
may wish to substitute judicial  review for the existinig  appFal imechanism.
For other counitries considering privatizing their telecommuinicationis  sector, one of' the most
important lessons from the Argentine expcrience is the importanice  of establishing a well-defined
regu!atory regime as early as possible in the privatization process and of adherinlg  to a transparent and
predictable process.  This will reduIcc  the risk premium demanded by  investors.  Argentinia had a very
narrow window of opportunity  in which to implement the privatization of ENTOe  and so it chose not
to wait until a regulatory regime was in place.  I lad it tried to implemenit bothi  a regulatory reginle and
the privatization  it may not have sutcceeded with cithier.  However, this choice appears to have
increased the risk premia required by investors and reduced the government's  ability to capture the
returns from the privatization.
Privatization in a series of staggered tranches of shares seems to provide governments with an
opportunity to capture the returns from improved credibility.  This strategy may be especially useful to
countries where there are doubt as to governments'  abilities to provide stable regulatioll.  Thlese
countries may have to tolerate  high risk premia in the sale of the initial tranche, but if tiley improve
their reputations these premia will be lower in the sale of subsequent tranches.  However, it is
important the first tranche offered for sale be large enough to give a credible signal of a change in
regime.  In most cases this would mean sciling a controlling interest in the firm.  The widespread
distribution  of share ownership can also reduce the likely hood that the privatization would be
reversed, as this reversal would affect too many parties.
Finally, in choosing strategies for price regulation, some caution should be exercised when
selecti.  g an RPI-X formula.  Superficially, this seems to be a simple approach that requires little effort
to monitor.  A starting level of tariffs is set and then increases are held to inflation less some amount
X which is intended to reflect technological innovation.  However, the effect of this type of regulation
is dependent on the starting price level.  Setting this initial level is extremely problematic in cases
whiere governments do not have the information required to determine what sort of return this
generates.  In such cases, as in Argentina, if the potential buyers  are telecommunications operating
companies, the buyers will have a significant iniformation  and therefore bargaining advantage.  In
Argentina this led to the government's  agreemenit,  withlout full knowledge, to an initial tariff  level that
was very profitable to the buyers at the expense of consumers.
VIII. Conclusion
While it is too early to be certain of the outcome of Argentina's  economic reform program in
general and the privatization  of ENTei in specific,  the impact appears  to be positive. As discussed  in
section six, expectations  regarding Argentina's econoric  future seem to have improved dramatically
since the beginning of the Menem administration.  The net impact of the privatization of ENTel itself
on welfare in Argentina  is promising.  If Argentina succeeds in implementing an effective regulatory
regime along the lines outlined in the regulatory decree and if the telecommunications companies meet
the performance targets outlined in the Pliego, the direct  gains to the country from improvements in
the telecommunications sector should be substantial.  Based on a partial equilibrium analysis that is
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from state to private ownership expressed in net present value terms is US$ 1,946 mnillion  in  1991
dollars.  The breakdown of these benefits is givenl in Table 7 arid Figure  11.  Of these bellefits,
US$ 2,853 million accrued to the govermnent.  Most of the governmenit's gains come  from the higher
taxes it will be able to collect, while a smaller proportion conies from the caslh  proceeds from the sale.
The gain to government  is essentially a gain to taxpayers, whose liability is reduced,
This gain to taxpayers in partially offset by a loss to consumers.  Because of thie large increase
in the pulse rate, consumers of telephone services are projected to he US$  1,164 million wvorse  off
Consumers will gain from the increased quanitity of services that will become available because of thc
privatization.  However, this increase in services is niot  projected to outweigh the effects of the price
increase until 1996.  The estimation does not take into account chang.-r in quality;  if the two
companies meet the performance targets in the Pliego this should lead to an unmeasured benefit to
consumers.
It is important to note that the pre-privatization rates charged to consumers did not reflect
ENTel's  costs of operation; as shown in Table 4, ENTel's  losses were large and growing.  As a result,
Argentine taxpayers effectively had been subsidizing the consumers of telephone services.  While
telephone penetration  in Argentina is reasonably high, not all taxpayers had access to telephone
services.  Those who did not were predominantly poor and rural.  Thus the taxpayer subsidy to ENTel
represented a transfer from these groups to urban middle- and upper-class groups.
Benefits of US$ 69 million are projected to accrue to domestic non-labor shareholders; US$
174 million  to ENTel's  former employees; and US$ 13 million to telephone cooperatives and other
suppliers.  In addition to the net domestic benefits., the foreign shareholders of the two companies are
projected to accrue benefits of US$ 3,345 million of which US$ 3,214 million accrues to the foreign
members of the operating consortia.  (US$ 31 million of the benefits to domestic shareholders were
received by Argentine members of the consortia.)  The high level of rents accruing to the consortia
raises a question regarding the competitiveness of the bidding process.  In theory, a competitive
bidding process should have extracted future rents through the price paid in the auction.  Yet,
according to these estimates, this does not seeni to have happened.
One possibility  is that the successful consortia may have had access to inside information
during the bidding process.  However, there  is no evidence that this happened.  Another explanation is
that when making their bid the consortia used higher discount rates than those used for the estimates.
Uncertainty about the country, the risk of future regulatory changes, and the risk of renationalization
are amongst the considerations that would lead foreign purchasers to have a higher discount rate.
After the fact the consortia may have discovered that they had overestimated the risks and were
therefore  enjoying higher gains than they had anticipated.  Finally, it may not be correct to classify the
bidding process as fully competitive.  Only three groups actually submitted bids and one of the three
dropped  out.  This left the government of Argentina with very little leverage when negotiating the
transfer contract and permitted the Telefonica and Telecom to hold out for higher pulse prices after the
bidding process was over.  This transferred rents from consumers to the telecommunications firms
(and to the government via taxes).
These results reinforce the recommendations in section seven regarding the process of
privatization and the sequencing of privatization with the implementation of regulatiotn. Transparency
and predictability  in the privatization process itself are important, as is the development of well-THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 36
defined regulatory regime before privatization.  If when privatizing ENTel it had been feasible to
develop a regulatory regime earlier and if the privatization process itself had been more predictable,
the government of Argentina probably would have been able to capture more of the benefits of
privatization for its citizens.  However, that being said, the benefits to Argentina of the privatization of
ENTel do appear to be large and positive.  More importantly, the reform  program seems to have
begun to alter the underlying structure of the Argentine economv, shifting the balance between the
public and private sectors.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 37
ANNEX A. A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of the Net Impact of the Privatization and the
Distribution of Costs and Benefits.
One would expect that changes both in technical and allocative efficiency and in distributionl
would result from a change in ownership.  These effects of privatization can be estimated in a partial
equilibrium context using cost-benefit methodology developed by Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang.'
This involves developing projections for the flows generated by a firm, first in the case of private
operation and then for the counterfactual case as if the firm continued to operate in the public sector.
Comparison of these two cases permits the estimation of the change in benefits accruing to different
groups as a result of the change in ownership.  Since the focus is on the difference between the two
cases, estimation  is less problematic than the estimation of the absolute value of the flows in each
case.
This partial equilibrium estimate of the change in welfare with the change in ownership can be
broken down into a number of components.  We have considered eight different groups: the domestic
purchaser of the firm; the foreign iurchasers  of the firm; the employees of the firm; the finn's
competitors;  its suppliers; consumers of the firm's  services; the government and citizens.  This permits
an estimate of relative changes in welfare between these groups.
This analysis focuses on the present value of the flows during the ten year period after
ENTel's transfer  in November  1990.  This is consistent with the regulatory framework; ten years is the
maximum  period for which the government will grant monopoly power to Telecom and Telefonica.  It
is not clear to what degree competition in the area of basic services will take place after the year 2000.
In addition, the consideration of flows after the ten year period will have a minimal impact on their
present values.
The projected  flows of Telecom and Telefonica are combined and treated as if they were those
of a single firm.  This facilitates the comparison to the counterfactual  projections of ENTel operating
as a single, government-owned  firm.  This consolidation is feasible since both Telecom and Telefonica
face the same regulationi  and enjoy identical monopoly licenses for the same ten year period. 2
All flows are projected  in constant US dollars.  lhe real discount rates used are  16.5% in
1990, 14% in  1991, and  11.5% from  1992 onwards.  These rates reflect the fall in the country risk
premium and international rates in general since 1990.  For the purposes of the projection, real deposit
'  Leroy Jones, Pankaj Tandon, and Ingo Vogelsang, Selling Public Enterprises: A Cost-Benefit
Methodology, (Cambridge, Ma: The MIT Press, 1990).  This methodology is further developed in a
paper presented at the World Bank conference on the welfare consequences of selliig  public
enterprises,  "Questions and Approaches to Answers" by Ahmed Galal, Leroy Jones. Pankaj Tanidon,
and Ingo Vogelsang.  For a detailed discussion of the application of this methodology to the case of
telecommunications  in Argentina see Manuel Abdala. Distributional Impact Evaluation of Dikestiture
in a High  Inflation Economy: The Case of ENTel Argentina. Doctoral Disseriation. Boston University,
1992.  The estimates presented in this case study are updated versions of the estimations prescnted in
the dissertation.
2  This does ignore the effects of potential economies of scope.THE ARGENTINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 38
rates of 4% a year and loan rates of 12% are used.  The spread between the two is high, but reflects
current conditions for dollar denominated finance in Argentina.
The projections for the combined Telecom and Telefonica case are based on: (i) the valuation
report prepared by the National  Development Bank; (ii) the investment targets and pricinig regimc laid
out in the regulatory framework; (iii) the accounts of the two companlies  through March  1992; and (iv)
the business plans and quantitative  information in the prospectuses for the firmis' public offerings.  'I'lTe
actual pulse price until August  1992 is used and then it is assumed that the pulse price will follow the
new pricing formula to vary with the US CPI on a semiannual basis,  Inflation in Argenitina has been
higher than that  in the US, which means that the real pulse price has declined.  It is assumed that this
relative decline will continue.  So far as their investment plans go,  it is assumed that tihe  firms will
meet the quantitative targets necessary to extend the exclusive period to ten years.  Intermediate input
prices, mainly for equipment, are assumed to be exogenous and to grow at rate linked to wholesale
prices and the exchange rate.  Real average wage level for the private firms are projected to stay at the
same level as in 1991.  Based on actual data productivity gains are estimated at  14% in 1991 and at
8% and  1.5% for Telecom and Telefonica respectively in  1992.  In accordance with current
managerial expectations  in the firms, an 8% productivity improvement is projcrted  for  1993.  After
1993, labor productivity  improvements are assumed to be 4.2% per annum,  1% higher than  ENTel's
historical rate of increase of 3.2%.
The projections for ENTel are based on: (i) the firm's  performance from  1980 to  1990 and (ii)
on the information on the state of ENTel just  prior to the privatization that was provided in the
National Bank for  Development's  valuation of the firm.  The assumptions in the counterfactual
projection are different  in a number of aspects.  These involve the pricing regime, the treatment of
labor, the level of investments, and the conditions of the sale.  The basic assumption on the pulse price
is that in the absence of thic privatization the price would not have increased as much as it did.
Instead, it is assumed that the pulse price would have been adjusted to compensate for the high level
of inflation in the first quarter of  1991 and then would have stayed at the same real level for the
duration of the period.  The growth in labor productivity is estimated to be lower than  in the private
firm case; it is project to continue to increase a the historical rate of 3.2%.  New investment is
projected to continue at an annual level comparable to the average level achieved betw'een 1980 and
1989.  Without the debt restructuring that took place before the privatization, ENTel would hiave
continued to operate with a higher level of debt and its associated expenses.
Based on these assumptions, it is estimated that as a result of the transfer  in ownership, the
value of the firm to society has increased by US$ 5,209 million  in constant 1991 dollars.  (Table 7
presents the base case reflecting the assumptions outlined above and the outcomes when the discount
and  loan rates are vary  by plus and minus 5%.  The general results are robust.)  Of this amount, US$
2,853 million accrued to the government.  The most important effect  is due to the change in tax
revenue which brings in an additional US$ 2,185 million.  With the privatization the government gives
up the collection of the indirect tax it levied on telecommunications, but this is more than out-weighed
by the increased revenues from the value-added and corporate taxes.  The cash proceeds from the sale,
less transaction costs, are the second most important contribution to the governments'  benefits.
totalling US$  1,883 million.  Quasi-rents of the order of US$ 695 million that the government would
have earned as a shareholder in ENTel are given up.  While external debt worth US$ 1,493 tnillion
was canceled the government took on debt of US$ 2,0!3  from ENTel as part of its financial
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Consumers as a group are estimated to be US$ 1,164 million worse off as a result of the
privatization.  The higher prices for service in the private firimi  scenario reduces consumer surplus,
particularly  in the first half of the nineties.  This is offset  in the second half of the nineties by the
benefits accruing  from the increase in the quantity of services available as a result ot' increased
investment.  Another source of benefits for consumers are the externalities created by the growth of'
the network, which makes telephone services more valuable to new and existing users.  Aside from
this network externality,  changes in quality have not b,n  included in the calculations.
Once discounted, the early costs to consumers resulting from the higher pulse price dominant
the results.  If is important to note that different categories of consumers will have different exposures
to the change in prices.  As prices are rebalanced, residential customers and those who make intra-
urban call are likely to experience the largest price increase, while business customers and long-
distance users should experience a relative decrease in prices.
It is also important to note that prior to the privatization ENTel operated at loss.  That is to
say, the prices charged to consumers did not cover the cost of the services provided.  Since these
losses were a liability of the Argentine federal government, effectively  Argentine taxpayers were
subsidizing the consumers of telephone services who were for the most part urban and relatively
affluent.
Telephone cooperatives, together with other competitors providing private circuits and other
miscellaneous goods, should register a net gain if the behave a price-takers and increase their prices to
the same level as Telecom and Telefonica.  The magnitude of the gain is small, US$  13 million,
because the size of this segment of thfv  industry is small.
The impact on the Argentine suppliers of telecommunications equipment has not been
calculated.  However, it appears that the impact of the privatization has been mixed.  T'he prices these
suppliers have been able to charge has been dramatically reduced, but, unlike ENTel, the two private
companies can actually pay for the equipment they purchase.
Provided that the Argentine fulfills its commitment to transfer  10% of the privatized
companies shares to ENTel former employees, labor gains from the transfer of ownership.  After
deducting the foregone rents associated with changes in their labor contracts, employees gain US$  1  74
million.
The value of the two firmns  combined private earnings is US$ 6,753.  Subtracti".g the US$ 466
of the flows accruing to the workers'  shares, this means that the present value of the 90% sold to the
consortia and in the public offerings is US$ 6,287.  This is much hiigher than the US$ 2,954 that the
private owners paid for the two firms togetther.  However, this is verv close to the stock market value
of the firm.  Re-expressed in  1992 dollars, the projected value of the two firms together is US$ 8,423.'
The stock market value for  100% of the firm has ranged from a low of US$ 5,789 million to a high of
US$ 10,082 and was US$ 7,419 million at the end of August 1992.
3  Recall that the discount rates used in the model for are  16.5% for  1990 and  14% for  1991.THE ARGENTINE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  Page 40
The domestic members of the holding companies enjoy a net benefit of UJS$  45 million from
their participation the transaction.  The Argentine purchasers who bought approximately  60% of the
stock available through the public offerings of the two finns  enjoy a gain of US$ 43 millioni.  T'his is
despite the fact that Telecom stock nas dropped from its initial offer price of 0.399 a share to 0.288 at
the end of August,  1992.
The foreign buyers of the two telecommunications firms, including both those in the
consortium and those who bought shares in the public offering, are the largest beneficiaries of the
transfer.  The net benefit to this group is US$ 3,245 million of which US$ 3,214 mnillion  accrues to
the foreign members of the operating consortia.  Many of chese buyers were financial institutions
which swapped their holdings of Argentine government debt in order to make this purchase.  This
transaction appears to have been very profitable for these investors.
The high level of rents accruing to the consortia raises a question regarding the
competitiveness of the bidding process.  In theory, a competitive bidding process should have
extracted future rents through the price paid in the auction.  Yet, according to these estimates, this
does not seem to have happened.
One possibility is that the successful consortia may have had access to inside infonmation
during the bidding process.  However, there is no evidence t'iat  this happened.  Another possibility is
that when making their bid the consortia used higher discount rates than those used for the estimateF.
Uncertainty about the country, the risk of future regulatory changes, and the risk of renationalization
are amongst the considerations that would lead foreign purchasers to have a higher discount rate.
After the fact the consortia may hiave  discovered that they had overestimated the risks and were
therefore enjoying  higher gains than they had anticipated.  Finally, the bidding process may not have
been fully competitive.  Only three groups actually submitted bids and one of the three dropped out.
This left the governmeit  of Argentina with very little leverage when negotiating the transfer contract
and permitted the 'I'elefonica and Telecom so hold out for higher pulse prices after the bidding process
was over.  This transferred  rents from consumers to the telecommunications firms (arid on to the
govermment via taxes).
Whatever the reason for the rents accruing to the members of the consortia, the fact that many
of these benefits accrue to foreigners means that the net benefit to Argentina is less than the total
social benefit resulting from the transfer.  Subtracting the benefits accruing to foreigners, the net
domestic benefit to Argenltina from the transfer of ownership is US$  1,965 million.  This is a
substantial benefit, but it is less thian half of the total estimated benefits.  This raises the question as to
whether this proportion mighit have been higher if there had been more competition or less uncertainty
in the bidding process.THE ARGENTINE  TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  Page 41
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Table  1  Presidents of Argentina,  1862-1992
Name  Period  Mcans of Accessioni  to Office
Bartolome Mitre . .....................  1862-68 .......  Military victory
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento  .....  .......  1868-74 .......  Election
Nicola Avellaneda ...........  .........  1874-80 .......-.  do-
Julio Argentino  Roca  .........  .........  1880-86 .......-.  do-
Miguel Juarez Celman  ........  .........  1886-90  .......  -do-
Carlos Pellegrini  (vice president) .....  .....  1890-92 .......  Resignation  of president
Luis Saenz Pefia ......................  1892-95 .......  Election
Jose Evaristo Uriburu (vice president  ....  ...  1  895-98  .......  Resignation of president
Julio Argentino  Roca  .........  .........  1898-1904  .....  Election
Manuel Quintana  ............  .........  1904-06 .......  -do-
Jose Figueroa Alcorta (vice president)  ......  1906-10 .......  Death of president
Roque Saenz Pefia  ..........  ..........  1910-14 .......  Election
Victorino de la Plaza (vice president)  ....  ...  1914-16 .......  Death of president
Hip6lito Yrigoyen  ..........  ..........  1916-22 .......  Election
Marcelo T. de Alvear  ........  ..........  1922-28 .......-.  do-
Hip6lito Yrigoyen  ..........  ..........  1928-30 .......  -do-
Jose F. Uriburu . ......................  1930-32 .......  Military revolt
Agustin P. Justo .......................  1932-38 .......  Election
Roberto  M. Ortiz ...........  ..........  1938-40 .......  -do-
Ram6n S. Castillo (vice president)  ....  .....  1940-43 .......  Delegation of authority by
president
Arturo J. Rawson  ...........  ..........  1943  ........  Military revolt
Pedro Pablo Ramirez  ........  ..........  1943-44 .......  Coup d'etat
Edelmiro J. Farrell  ..........  ..........  1944-46 .......  -do-
Juan Domingo Per6n  ........  ..........  1946-55 .......  Election
Eduardo Lonardi  ...........  ..........  1955  ........  Military revolt
Pedro E. Aramburu  .........  ..........  1955-58 .......  Coup d'etat
Arturo Frondizi . ......................  1958-62 .......  Election
Jose M. Guido  .......................  1962-63 .......  Coup d'etat
Arturo Illia  .........................  1963-66 .......  Election
Juan Carlos Ongania .........  ..........  1966-70 .......  Military revolt
Roberto Marcelo Levingston  ......  .......  1970-71 .......  Coup d'etat
Alejandro  Agustin Lanusse  ......  ........  1971-73 .......-.  do-
Hector J. Campora  ..........  ..........  1973  ........  Election
Juan Domingo Peron  ........  ..........  1973-74 .......-.  do-
Maria Estela (Isabel)
Martinez de Peron (vice president)  ....  ....  Jul 74-Mar 76 ...  Death of president
Jorge Rafael Videla  ......  ......  May 76-Mar 81  . Coup de6tat
Roberto  Viola  .....  .........  NIar-Dec  81  ...  . Resignation  of  president
Leopoldo Galtieri  .......  .......  Dec 81-Jun 82  ..  -do-
Reynaldo  B.  Bignone  .............  . Jul  82-Dec  83  ...  Military  revolt
Raul Alfonsin  .....  .........  Dec 83-Jun 89  . . Election
Carlos  Saul Menem  ..........  ....  June 1989-  ......  ElectionTable  2  46
ENTel's  Demand  Backlog
Estimated  Unfilled  Unfilled  Orders as
Line Orders  Unes in Service  Percentage  of
Year  (000's)  (000's)  Unes in Service
1  Q76  622  1678  37
1977  698  1692  41
1978  776  1728  45
1979  863  1797  48
1980  934  1879  50
1981  894  1992  45
1982  896  2124  42
1983  1026  2245  46
1984  1193  2357  51
1985  1298  2462  53
1986  1149  2606  44
1987  851  2721  31
1988  686  2856  24
1989  283  3058  9
1990  361  3096  12
1991  333  3220  10
Sourco: ENTJI  19BS  Report,  SIGEP,  and  Telefornica  and Telecom  repoths.Table 3  4 7
Selected Service Quality  Indicators for  ENTel
Long Distance  Average  Pending
Local Calls  Domestic  Calls  Repair  Orders  as  Average  Repair
Completed  Completed  Percentage  of  Waiting Time
Year  (percent)  (percent)  Lines  in Service  (days)
1975  NA  NA  1.6  16
1976  NA  NA  2.0  15
1977  NA  NA  3.0  30
1978  NA  NA  1.6  24
1979  NA  NA  0.7  12
1980  NA  NA  0.9  12
1981  NA  NA  1.0  14
1982  43.6  NA  1.0  10
1983  48.6  27.1  1.3  8
1984  47.0  24.8  1.9  12
1985  43.7  21  6  1.4  10
1986  44.6  18.4  1.5  10
1987  46.0  NA  1.3  10
1988  47.C  23.0  1.6  10
1989  48.9  29.2  2.0  11
1990  49.0  29.7  2.5  11
Standard  95.0  85.0  0.5  2
Souroe: ENTo/.  SIGEP,  roefonica and Telecom  reporh.I able  4
ENTel's Profits (Losses) and Investment
1980-1990 (millions  of australes)
ENTel's  Profits and Losses  ENTel's  ENTel's  Investment
(current prices)  Contribution to  ENTel  GOP  ENTel's  Gross hnvestment  as a Share  of
GDP  Argentina's  GDP  as Share  of  Investment  in Argentina  Gross Investment
(1970  australes)  (1970 australes)  Arg. GOP  (1970  australes)  (1970  australes)  in Argentina
YEAR  SIGEP  (1)  PEPIS  (2)  (3)  (3)  (percent)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1980  0.006  0.004  105.1  11295.3  0.930  137.58
1981  0.020  0.047  106.9  10542.9  1.014  3.24  105.40  3.07
1982  0.028  (0.321)  116.7  10020.8  1.165  1.69  84.61  2.00
1983  0.472  3.912  124.9  10321.0  1.210  2.07  75.59  2.74
1984  (184.700)  (181.000)  131.8  10584.9  1.245  2.09  67.23  3.11
1985  (77.105)  (70.000)  142.5  9876.5  1.443  1.14  53.78  2.12
1986  (536.479)  (438.000)  152.5  10656.2  1.431  1.92  62.72  3.06
1987  531.945  753.000  160.9  10870.9  1.480  3.92  73.43  5.34
1988  (6,481.000)  169.6  10654.0  1.592  7.94  65.49  12.12
1989  151.7  9785.7  1.550  3.36  46.01  7.30
1990
Sourcos au,d  Notes:
(1) SIGEP,  'Estacibs  C*ontabes  rb las Pninpahes  Emprosas  Piblicas,  1980- 1987.
P2)  PEPIS  Profis  nd losses rom ENTeol'sipots  ha  beenadjusted to oorrectforinflton  accountng piocodms  andextraoroVnaiy  ims.
(3)  OE. 'Falidd  Edoond  mica 92-9X  (based  on SIGEP nd BCI4.
(4) SIGEP. Dat  bto 1981-86 periodindude Post  Office.
) IEER4L
(6) Data  for 1981  -86 pedod Indude Post Ofice.49
TABLE 5: ORIGINAL SCHEDULE FOR THE SALE OF ENTEL
January  10, 1990  :  Publication of the call to bid.
January 22  Opening of the consultation period.
March 2  :  Last date to carry on consultations on the Document.
March 21  :  Deadline for the presentation of bidc'ers for their
prequalification, and the opening of the presentations
at  18 hrs.
March 28  Notification of the results of the prequalification.
April 5  :  Opening of the period of access to information.
May 22  :  Closing of the period of access to  information.
June 11  Deadline for the presentation of the proposals of the
prequalified bidders, and opening of the proposals at
18 hrs.
June 14  Notification of the preaward.
June 22  . Deadline for the presentation of objections to the
preaward.
June 28  :  Deadline for the award by decree of the Executive
Branch and resolution of the objections to the
preaward.
August 6  :  Deadline to sign the Transfer Contract.
October 8  :  Deadline to Take Possession.
I50
Table 6
Membership  of the Cointel  and Nortel Consortia
TELEFONICA  --  Shareholding  in Cointel  consortium
Percentage
Investor  Ownership
CVC(Citicorp Venture Capital)  20.00%
Banco Rio de la Plata S.A.  15.26%
Telefonica International  10.  13%
Inversora Catalinas  6.13%
Banco Central de Espana S.A.  7.04%
Sociedad Comercial del Plata S.A.  5.14%
Banco Hispano Americano S.A.  5.00%
Telarg Investment Corp.  4.33%
Southtel Equity Corporation  4.22%
Zurich Ltd.  4  16%
The Bank of Toyko Limited  4.16%
The Bank of New York  4.16%
Other  Investors*  7.99%
100.00%
* No one of which owns 4.16% or more




France Cables  32.50%
Perez Companc  25.00%
J.P.  Morgan  9.75%
Morgan Capital Corporation  0.25%
100.00%Table 7
Evaluation of Impact of ENTel Divestiture (millions  of 1991 dollars)
Base Case  Discount  + Loan Rate 5% lower  Discount +  Loan Rate 5% higher
PRVATE  PUBUC  Oiference  PRVATE  PUBUC  1  Oience  PlVATE  P|ruec  Odrence
GOVERNMENT
+Taxes  6.247  4.061  2,185  7.709  5.3se  2.313  5.186  2,995  2,192
+ Not Ouasi Rnbt  636  1.331  (695)  66e  2.813  (2.145)  807  383  224
+ Net Sale Procuds  (cash)  1,e83  0  1.683  1.972  0  1.972  1.t03  0  1.803
+ Debt Takeover  (2,013)  0  (2.013  (1.936  0  (1.936)  C2.093M  0  (2.093)
Govweenmen Subtotal  6.753  5,393  1.360  6.413  8.209  204  5.504  3.37a  2.126
+DebtCancefledatMadcetValue  955  0  955  955  0  9s5  955  0  055
+ Debt Cancelld  at Exces  Mauket  Value  s53  0  s3  141  0  141  984  0  964
Govrnment  Total  8,246  5.393  2.853  9.509  029  1.300  7.443  3.378  4.096
EMPLOYEES
+As  Sharlxldeu  466  0  468  693  0  893  319  0  319
+Labor Rents  0  292  (292  0  361  (351)  0  248  (
*RWVATE  DOMESTIC  SHAREHOLDERS
+ Olv_u  L%n-Nbws  43  0  43  434  0  434  (204)  0  (204)
+Concentratod  Sharehddsm  45  0  4S  e1  0  el  32  0  32
FOREIGN  SHAREHOLDERS
+Conerotia  3214  0  3.214  4,723  0  4.723  2203  0  2.203
+ DIvm  SharehDuldw  31  0  31  305  a  305  (143)  0  (143)
COMPETITORS  123  110  13  169  152  17  91  61  10
PROVIDERS  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
CITIZENS
+VlsStudowI  rs0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
SUBTOTAL  12.168  5.795  6.372  15.894  8.712  7.181  9.741  3.707  6.034
CONSUMERS  64.574  65.738  (1.164)  79.619  eo.357  (73"  63.735  05.158  (1.422)
TOTAL  76.742  71.33  609  95,612  90.070  0.443  83.476  6S.65  4,611
WELFARE  RESULT
Not  ChaFh  In  Welfare  wAtInp  &gnm  1te6.  1.414  2652
-Toblaws Aweig&,  Ij  fr  tbTable 8  5  2
Operating Results for TELECOM and TELEFONICA
TELECOM  TELEFONICA
Fiscai  yearending  Setember30,  1991  ii.  1 1992  1991  /i.  J  1992
On  millions  of US  dollars)  ,.  __
Operating  Revenues  890  1,211  1,161  1,597
Depreclation  273  288  217  265
Managment  fees  42  55  48  60
Net  Income  56  152  122  221
DMdends  /3.  51  111  29  86
Shareholders'  equity  at purchase  price($)
Consortium  (60%)  539  631
Diverse  (30%)  1,227  830
Intemra  Rate  of Retum
Operator  /4.  26.9%  203.2%
Consortium  58.1%  72.4%
Diverse  -67.5%  42.9%
Note:  Constant  1992  trms.
/1. Elevn months  to September  30,  1991
/2. 1 USS  - .9913  pesos
/3. TELECOM  only:  to  be  paid  out  In  following  yeo
/4. Based  on ouUay  for purchase  and  foe onlyTable  9
IELEFONICA  and  TELECOM  lnve  ent,_1991  1997
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  Total
TELEFONIC6  INVESTMWEN 
Teoltonica's  netwotk  Investments  208.6  615.2  549.2 t.  558.5/n.  596.3 i.  639.0 n.  3,166.8 on mNions of US doo>s)
Lines in service added In
fiscal year ending 9/30  66,176  276,364
(unauditecd
Lines In services to be added
per calendar year - for seven yew exclusivity  70,000  105.000  154,000  136.000  85,000  69,000  619,000
- for ten year  exclusMty  91,000  137.000  200,000  176,000  111,000  89.000  804.000
TELECOM  INVESTMENT
Teleconr's  network  Investments  132.0  609.0  771.4  ,t.  688.0  n.  600.8  ti.  596.5 it.  3.397.8 tin mEmN  -orUS  oRas)  (1991 -1 996?
Lines In service added In
fiscal  year ending 9/30  50,809  221,941
(unauditee
Lines In services to be added
per calendar year
- for seven  year  exclusivity  60,000  90,000  135,000  121,000  87,000  72.000  12,000  577,000
- for ten year  exdusIvity  79,000  117,000  175.000  160,000  114.000  92,000  15,000  752.000
ni.  Qn"np  p-ojecikn
I.JUnes In Service (thousands)
Ul~~~~~~~~~-
(AC









Telephone Density in  Argentina, 1946 - 1992
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Argentina  Stock  Market  Index
and  Closing  Prices  for TELECOM  and  TELEFONICA
(January 1989 - March  1993)
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